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Demand Commitment Bargaining: -The Case Of Apex Games

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Author Info

  • BENNETT, E.
  • VAN DAMME, E.

Abstract

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Tilburg - Center for Economic Research in its series Papers with number 9062.

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Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: 1990
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:tilbur:9062

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Postal: TILBURG UNIVERSITY, CENTER FOR ECONOMIC RESEARCH, 5000 LE TILBURG THE NETHERLANDS.
Phone: 31 13 4663050
Fax: 31 13 4663066
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Web page: http://center.uvt.nl/
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Keywords: game theory ; bargaining ; economic models;

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Maria Montero & Juan Vidal-Puga, 2005. "Demand commitment in legislative bargaining," Game Theory and Information, EconWPA 0511005, EconWPA.
  2. Chatterjee, K. & Dutta, B., 1994. "Rubinstein auctions: On competition for bargaining partners," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research 1994-57, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  3. Gersbach, Hans & Haller, Hans, 2010. "Bargaining cum Voice," CEPR Discussion Papers 7774, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  4. Montero, Maria, 2002. "Non-cooperative bargaining in apex games and the kernel," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 309-321, November.
  5. László Á. Kóczy, 2001. "Accession Games: A Dynamic Per-Member Partition Function Aapproach," Game Theory and Information, EconWPA 0111002, EconWPA.
  6. Gerard van der Laan & Vitaly Pruzhansky, 2004. "Demand Adjustment in Coalitional Games," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 04-121/1, Tinbergen Institute.
  7. Klaus Abbink, 2006. "Majority rip-off in referendum voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 26(1), pages 1-21, January.
  8. Asheim, Geir B, 1997. "Individual and Collective Time-Consistency," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 64(3), pages 427-43, July.
  9. Juan Vidal-Puga, 2003. "Bargaining with commitments," Game Theory and Information, EconWPA 0306002, EconWPA.
  10. Montero, M.P., 2002. "Two-Stage Bargaining with Reversible Coalitions: The Case of Apex Games," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research 2002-26, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  11. Hans Gersbach & Hans Haller, 2006. "Voice and Bargaining Power," CESifo Working Paper Series 1668, CESifo Group Munich.

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