Stable outcomes for contract choice problems
AbstractIn this paper, we consider the problem of choosing a set of multi-party contracts, where each coalition of agents has a non-empty finite set of feasible contracts to choose from. We call such problems, cntract choic problems. We provide conditions under which a contract choice problem has a non-empty set of "stable" outcomes. There are two types of stability concepts we study in this paper:cooperative stability and non- cooperative stability. The cooperative stability concept that we invoke here is the core. We also show, that a simple generalization of the Deferred Acceptance Procedure with men proposing due to Gale and Shapley(1962), yeilds outcomes for a generalized marriage problem, which necessarily belong to the core. The non-cooperative stability concept that we study here is individual stability. The final result of this paper states that every contract choice problem has a non-empty weak bargaining st.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Department of Mathematics, Corvinus University of Budapest in its journal Pure Mathematics and Applications.
Volume (Year): 15 (2004)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Other versions of this item:
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
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