Stable Outcomes For Contract Choice Problems
In this paper, we consider the problem of choosing a set of multi-party contracts, where each coalition of agents has a non-empty finite set of feasible contracts to choose from. We call such problems, cntract choic problems. We provide conditions under which a contract choice problem has a non-empty set of "stable" outcomes. There are two types of stability concepts we study in this paper:cooperative stability and non- cooperative stability. The cooperative stability concept that we invoke here is the core. We also show, that a simple generalization of the Deferred Acceptance Procedure with men proposing due to Gale and Shapley(1962), yeilds outcomes for a generalized marriage problem, which necessarily belong to the core. The non-cooperative stability concept that we study here is individual stability. The final result of this paper states that every contract choice problem has a non-empty weak bargaining st.
|Date of creation:||03 Nov 2003|
|Date of revision:|
|Note:||Type of Document - pdf; prepared on Win98; to print on hp Laserjet 2300d; pages: 17; figures: 0. 17 pages,pdf|
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