A Weak Bargaining Set for Contract Choice Problems
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- Lahiri, Somdeb, 2007. "A weak bargaining set for contract choice problems," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(4), pages 185-190, December.
References listed on IDEAS
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- Alkan, Ahmet, 1988. "Nonexistence of stable threesome matchings," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 207-209, October.
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- Lahiri, S., 2004. "Stable outcomes for contract choice problems," Pure Mathematics and Applications, Department of Mathematics, Corvinus University of Budapest, vol. 15(4), pages 409-418.
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- Felix Brandt & Paul Harrenstein, 2010. "Characterization of dominance relations in finite coalitional games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 69(2), pages 233-256, August.
More about this item
KeywordsWeak bargaining set; Contract choice; NTU game; Matching;
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
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