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A Group Incentive Compatible Mechanism Yielding Core Allocation

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  • Ehud Kalai

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Paper provided by Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science in its series Discussion Papers with number 329.

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Date of creation: May 1978
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Handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:329

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Postal: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 580 Jacobs Center, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL 60208-2014
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Web page: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/
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References

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  1. Foley, Duncan K, 1970. "Lindahl's Solution and the Core of an Economy with Public Goods," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 38(1), pages 66-72, January.
  2. Hurwicz, Leonid, 1979. "On allocations attainable through Nash equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 140-165, August.
  3. Vind, Karl, 1972. "A Third Remark on the Core of an Atomless Economy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 40(3), pages 585-86, May.
  4. Ehud Kalai & John Roberts, 1977. "A Simple Game of Exchange," Discussion Papers 280, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  5. Schmeidler, David, 1972. "A Remark on the Core of an Atomless Economy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 40(3), pages 579-80, May.
  6. Hurwicz, L, 1979. "Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(2), pages 217-25, April.
  7. Dreze, Jacques H & de la Vallee Poussin, D, 1971. "A Tatonnement Process for Public Goods," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(114), pages 133-50, April.
  8. Herbert E. Scarf, 1965. "The Core of an N Person Game," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 182R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  9. Ehud Kalai, 1977. "A Game of Barter with Barriers to Trade," Discussion Papers 302, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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Cited by:
  1. Peyton Young, H., 1998. "Cost allocation, demand revelation, and core implementation," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 213-228, December.
  2. Roberto Serrano, 2004. "Fifty Years of the Nash Program, 1953-2003," Working Papers 2004-20, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  3. Ozkal-Sanver, Ipek & Remzi Sanver, M., 2005. "Implementing matching rules by type pretension mechanisms," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 50(3), pages 304-317, November.
  4. Ehlers, Lars, 2004. "Monotonic and implementable solutions in generalized matching problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 114(2), pages 358-369, February.
  5. Papai, Szilvia, 2004. "Unique stability in simple coalition formation games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 337-354, August.
  6. Chen Ying Huang & Tomas Sjostrom, 2005. "Implementation of the Recursive Core for Partition Function Form Games," Economics Working Papers 0052, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
  7. Koji Takamiya, 2006. "On the equivalence of G-weak and -strong cores in the marriage problem," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(20), pages 1-8.
  8. Tone Dieckmann & Ulrich Schwalbe, 2000. "Dynamic Coalition Formation and the Core," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1878, Econometric Society.
  9. Marilda Sotomayor, 2012. "A further note on the college admission game," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 41(1), pages 179-193, February.
  10. Conley, John P. & Wooders, Myrna H., 2001. "Tiebout Economies with Differential Genetic Types and Endogenously Chosen Crowding Characteristics," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 98(2), pages 261-294, June.
  11. Bergin, James & Duggan, John, 1999. "An Implementation-Theoretic Approach to Non-cooperative Foundations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 50-76, May.
  12. Brennan Platt, 2009. "Spoilers, blocking coalitions, and the core," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 33(3), pages 361-381, September.
  13. Sonmez, Tayfun, 1997. "Games of Manipulation in Marriage Problems," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 169-176, August.
  14. Koji Takamiya, 2006. "Preference Revelation Games and Strong Cores of Allocation Problems with Indivisibilities," ISER Discussion Paper 0651, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
  15. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2006:i:20:p:1-8 is not listed on IDEAS
  16. Shlomo Weber & Hans Wiesmeth, 1990. "On the theory of cost sharing," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 52(1), pages 71-82, February.
  17. Koji Takamiya, 2006. "On the Equivalence of G-weak and -strong Cores in the Marriage Problem," ISER Discussion Paper 0652, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, revised Jul 2006.
  18. Konishi, Hideo & Le Breton, Michel & Weber, Shlomo, 1998. "Equilibrium in a Finite Local Public Goods Economy," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 224-244, April.
  19. Tone Dieckmann; & Ulrich Schwalbe, 1998. "Dynamic Coalition Formation and the Core," Economics, Finance and Accounting Department Working Paper Series n810798, Department of Economics, Finance and Accounting, National University of Ireland - Maynooth.
  20. Arnold, Tone & Schwalbe, Ulrich, 2002. "Dynamic coalition formation and the core," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 363-380, November.
  21. Shinotsuka, Tomoichi & Takamiya, Koji, 2003. "The weak core of simple games with ordinal preferences: implementation in Nash equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 379-389, August.
  22. Suh, Sang-Chul, 1996. "Implementation with coalition formation: A complete characterization," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(4), pages 409-428.

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