IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/nwu/cmsems/246.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Graphs and Cooperation in Games

Author

Listed:
  • Roger B. Myerson

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Roger B. Myerson, 1976. "Graphs and Cooperation in Games," Discussion Papers 246, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    • Handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:246
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/246.pdf
    File Function: main text
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. AUMANN, Robert J. & DREZE, Jacques H., 1974. "Cooperative games with coalition structures," LIDAM Reprints CORE 217, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Rodrigo J. Harrison & Roberto Munoz, 2003. "Stability and Equilibrium Selection in a Link Formation Game," Game Theory and Information 0306004, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Béal, Sylvain & Rémila, Eric & Solal, Philippe, 2012. "Weighted component fairness for forest games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 144-151.
    3. Guillaume Haeringer, 2000. "On the Stability of Cooperation Structures," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 472.00, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    4. KIRMAN, Alan, 1980. "Imperfect communication in markets – a big world problem.," Institut des Mathématiques Economiques – Document de travail de l’I.M.E. (1974-1993) 44, Institut des Mathématiques Economiques. LATEC, Laboratoire d'Analyse et des Techniques EConomiques, CNRS, Université de Bourgogne.
    5. Rod Garratt & James E. Parco & Cheng-Zhong Qin & Amnon Rapoport, 2005. "Potential Maximization And Coalition Government Formation," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 7(04), pages 407-429.
    6. Goyal, Sanjeev & Joshi, Sumit, 2003. "Networks of collaboration in oligopoly," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 57-85, April.
    7. Inderst, Roman & Wey, Christian, 2003. "Bargaining, Mergers, and Technology Choice in Bilaterally Oligopolistic Industries," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 34(1), pages 1-19, Spring.
    8. Jackson, Matthew O. & van den Nouweland, Anne, 2005. "Strongly stable networks," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 420-444, May.
    9. Dutta, Bhaskar & Ghosal, Sayantan & Ray, Debraj, 2005. "Farsighted network formation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 122(2), pages 143-164, June.
    10. Rachel E. Kranton & Deborah F. Minehart, 2001. "A Theory of Buyer-Seller Networks," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 485-508, June.
    11. Zissimos, Ben, 2002. "Why Are Trade Agreements Regional? A Theory based on Noncooperative Networks," Economic Research Papers 269465, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
    12. Matthew O. Jackson, 2002. "The Stability and Efficiency of Economic and Social Networks," Microeconomics 0211011, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    13. Hans Haller & Sudipta Sarangi, 2003. "Nash Networks with Heterogeneous Agents," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 337, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    14. Sergio Currarini, 2003. "On the Stability of Hierarchies in Games with Externalities," Working Papers 2003.19, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    15. Jinpeng Ma, 1998. "Strategic Formation of Coalitions," Departmental Working Papers 199810, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
    16. Juan Vidal-Puga, 2004. "Negotiating the membership," Game Theory and Information 0409003, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    17. Mutuswami, Suresh & Winter, Eyal, 2002. "Subscription Mechanisms for Network Formation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 106(2), pages 242-264, October.
    18. Matthew O. Jackson, 2003. "A Survey of Models of Network Formation: Stability and Efficiency," Game Theory and Information 0303011, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    19. Anna Khmelnitskaya, 2010. "Values for rooted-tree and sink-tree digraph games and sharing a river," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 69(4), pages 657-669, October.
    20. Jackson, Matthew O., 2005. "Allocation rules for network games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 128-154, April.
    21. Suresh Mutuswami & David Pérez-Castrillo & David Wettstein, 2001. "Bidding for the Surplus: Realizing Efficient Outcomes in General Economic Environments," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 479.01, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    22. Navarro, Noemí & Perea, Andrés, 2001. "Bargaining in networks and the myerson value," UC3M Working papers. Economics we016121, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    23. Francis Bloch & Matt Jackson, 2004. "The Formation of Networks with Side Payments," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 198, Econometric Society.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Sylvain Béal & Marc Deschamps & Mostapha Diss & Rodrigue Tido Takeng, 2024. "Cooperative games with diversity constraints," Working Papers hal-04447373, HAL.
    2. Caulier, Jean-François & Mauleon, Ana & Vannetelbosch, Vincent, 2015. "Allocation rules for coalitional network games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 80-88.
    3. Lukáš Adam & Tomáš Kroupa, 2017. "The intermediate set and limiting superdifferential for coalitional games: between the core and the Weber set," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(4), pages 891-918, November.
    4. Antonio Magaña & Francesc Carreras, 2018. "Coalition Formation and Stability," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 27(3), pages 467-502, June.
    5. Grabisch, Michel & Sudhölter, Peter, 2018. "On a class of vertices of the core," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 541-557.
    6. Sun, Ning & Trockel, Walter & Yang, Zaifu, 2008. "Competitive outcomes and endogenous coalition formation in an n-person game," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(7-8), pages 853-860, July.
    7. Del Castillo, Maria Fernanda & Dimitrakopoulos, Roussos, 2016. "A multivariate destination policy for geometallurgical variables in mineral value chains using coalition-formation clustering," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 322-332.
    8. Sylvain Béal & Sylvain Ferrières & Philippe Solal, 2022. "The priority value for cooperative games with a priority structure," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 51(2), pages 431-450, June.
    9. Montero, M.P., 2002. "Two-Stage Bargaining with Reversible Coalitions : The Case of Apex Games," Other publications TiSEM 7dba0283-bc13-4f2c-8f5e-5, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    10. Takaaki Abe, 2020. "Population monotonic allocation schemes for games with externalities," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 49(1), pages 97-117, March.
    11. Tejada, O. & Álvarez-Mozos, M., 2018. "Graphs and (levels of) cooperation in games: Two ways how to allocate the surplus," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 114-122.
    12. Ray, Debraj & Vohra, Rajiv, 2015. "Coalition Formation," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
    13. Joosung Lee, 2013. "Bargaining and Buyout," 2013 Papers ple701, Job Market Papers.
    14. Joosung Lee, 2015. "Multilateral Bargaining in Networks: On the Prevalence of Inefficiencies," Working Papers 2015.53, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    15. Chander, Parkash & Tulkens, Henry, 2006. "Cooperation, Stability and Self-Enforcement in International Environmental Agreements: A Conceptual Discussion," Coalition Theory Network Working Papers 12170, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
    16. Gabrielle Demange, 2017. "The stability of group formation," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 127(4), pages 495-516.
    17. Manfred Besner, 2022. "Harsanyi support levels solutions," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 93(1), pages 105-130, July.
    18. Toshiji Miyakawa, 2009. "Existence and efficiency of a stationary subgame-perfect equilibrium in coalitional bargaining models with nonsuperadditive payoffs," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 39(2), pages 291-306, May.
    19. Sylvain Béal & Anna Khmelnitskaya & Philippe Solal, 2018. "Two-step values for games with two-level communication structure," Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, Springer, vol. 35(2), pages 563-587, February.
    20. Yoshio Kamijo, 2013. "The collective value: a new solution for games with coalition structures," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, vol. 21(3), pages 572-589, October.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:246. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Fran Walker (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/cmnwuus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.