Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Potential Maximization and Coalition Government Formation

Contents:

Author Info

  • Garratt, Rod
  • Qin, Cheng-Zhong

Abstract

A model of coalition government formation is presented in which inefficient, non-minimal winning coalitions may form in Nash equilibrium. Predictions for five games are presented and tested experimentally. The experimental data support potential maximization as a refinement of Nash equilibrium. In particular, the data support the prediction that non-minimal winning coalitions occur when the distance between policy positions of the parties is small relative to the value of forming the government. These conditions hold in games 1, 3, 4 and 5, where subjects played their unique potential-maximizing strategies 91, 52, 82 and 84 percent of the time, respectively. In the remaining game (Game 2) experimental data support the prediction of a minimal winning coalition. Players A and B played their unique potential-maximizing strategies 84 and 86 percent of the time, respectively, and the predicted minimal-winning government formed 92 percent of the time (all strategy choices for player C conform with potential maximization in Game 2). In Games 1, 2, 4 and 5 over 98 percent of the observed Nash equilibrium outcomes were those predicted by potential maximization. Other solution concepts including iterated elimination of dominated strategies and strong/coalition proof Nash equilibrium are also tested.

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/2gx2v0qx.pdf;origin=repeccitec
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara in its series University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series with number qt2gx2v0qx.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 07 Apr 2000
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cdl:ucsbec:qt2gx2v0qx

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 2127 North Hall, Santa Barbara, CA 93106-9210
Phone: (805) 893-3670
Fax: (805) 893-8830
Web page: http://www.escholarship.org/repec/ucsbecon_dwp/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: Potential; Maximization; Coalition; Government; Formation;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Qin, Cheng-Zhong, 1996. "Endogenous Formation of Cooperation Structures," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 218-226, April.
  2. Slikker, Marco, 2001. "Coalition Formation and Potential Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 436-448, November.
  3. Monderer, Dov & Shapley, Lloyd S., 1996. "Potential Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 124-143, May.
  4. Slikker, Marco & Dutta, Bhaskar & van den Nouweland, Anne & Tijs, Stef, 2000. "Potential maximizers and network formation," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 55-70, January.
  5. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2003:i:5:p:1-9 is not listed on IDEAS
  6. Roger B. Myerson, 1976. "Graphs and Cooperation in Games," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 246, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  7. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2003:i:12:p:1-11 is not listed on IDEAS
  8. J. Keith Murnighan & Alvin E. Roth, 1977. "The Effects of Communication and Information Availability in an Experimental Study of a Three-Person Game," Management Science, INFORMS, INFORMS, vol. 23(12), pages 1336-1348, August.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Amegashie, J. Atsu & Cadsby, C. Bram & Song, Yang, 2007. "Competitive burnout: Theory and experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 213-239, May.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cdl:ucsbec:qt2gx2v0qx. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Lisa Schiff).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.