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Allocation Rules for Network Games

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Author Info
Matthew O. Jackson

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Abstract

Previous allocation rules for network games, such as the Myerson Value, implicitly or explicitly take the network structure as fixed. In many situations, however, the network structure can be altered by players. This means that the value of alternative network structures (not just sub-networks) can and should influence the allocation of value among players on any given network structure. I present a family of allocation rules that incorporate information about alternative network structures when allocating value.

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Paper provided by California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences in its series Working Papers with number 1160.

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Length: 33 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2003
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Publication status: Published: Games & Economic Behavior, 51 (2005) 128-154. Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
Handle: RePEc:clt:sswopa:1160

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Related research
Keywords: networks core Myerson Value Shapley Value allocation rules

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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports: References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Sergio Currarini & Massimo Morelli, 2000. "Network Formation with Sequential Demands," Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics 99/2, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London, revised Feb 2000. [Downloadable!]
  2. Sergio Currarini, 2002. "Stable Organizations with Externalities," Grand Coalition 10, Grand Coalition Web Site. [Downloadable!]
  3. Noemí Navarro & Andrés Perea, 2001. "Bargaining In Networks And The Myerson Value," Economics Working Papers we016121, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía. [Downloadable!]
  4. Mutuswami, S. & Winter, E., 2000. "Subscription Mechanisms for Network Formation," Papers 2000/20, Catholique de Louvain - Center for Operations Research and Economics.
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  5. Peleg, B, 1986. "On the Reduced Game Property and Its Converse," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 187-200.
  6. Perez-Castrillo, David & Wettstein, David, 2001. "Bidding for the Surplus : A Non-cooperative Approach to the Shapley Value," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 100(2), pages 274-294, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Bhaskar Dutta & Suresh Mutuswami, 1997. "Stable Networks," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 97-039/1, Tinbergen Institute.
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  8. Matthew O. Jackson & Asher Wolinsky, 1995. "A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks," Discussion Papers 1098R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Qin, Cheng-Zhong, 1996. "Endogenous Formation of Cooperation Structures," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 218-226, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Gilles, R.P. & Sarangi, S., 2003. "The role of trust in costly network formation," Discussion Paper 53, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Sergio Currarini, 2006. "Network Design in Games with Spillovers," Working Papers 2006_16, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari", Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Slikker, M. & Norde, H.W., 2004. "Symmetric convex games and stable structures," Discussion Paper 114, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  4. Paolo Pin, 2006. "Eight degrees of separation," Working Papers 2006_26, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari", Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  5. Noemí Navarro, 2008. "A Sensitive Flexible-network Approach," Working Papers 2008-2, Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center. [Downloadable!]
  6. Noemí NAVARRO & Róbert VESZTEG, 2007. "Fair ultimatum: an experimental study of the Myerson value," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 07.05, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP. [Downloadable!]
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