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Forming Efficient Networks

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  • David Pérez-Castrillo
  • David Wettstein

Abstract

In this paper, we suggest a simple sequential mechanism whose subgame perfect equilibria give rise to efficient networks. Moreover, the payoffs received by the agents coincide with their Shapley value in an appropriately defined cooperative game.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Barcelona Graduate School of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 123.

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Date of creation: Apr 2004
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Handle: RePEc:bge:wpaper:123

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Related research

Keywords: Networks; Implementation; Shapley Value;

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References

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  1. Matthew O. Jackson & Asher Wolinsky, 1994. "A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1098, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  2. Mutuswami, Suresh & Perez-Castrillo, David & Wettstein, David, 2004. "Bidding for the surplus: realizing efficient outcomes in economic environments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 111-123, July.
  3. MUTUSWAMI, Suresh & WINTER, Eyal, 2000. "Subscription mechanisms for network formation," CORE Discussion Papers, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) 2000020, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  4. Dutta, Bhaskar & Mutuswami, Suresh, 1997. "Stable Networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 322-344, October.
  5. Jackson, Matthew O., 2005. "Allocation rules for network games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 128-154, April.
  6. Sergio Currarini & Massimo Morelli, 2000. "original papers : Network formation with sequential demands," Review of Economic Design, Springer, Springer, vol. 5(3), pages 229-249.
  7. Perez-Castrillo, David & Wettstein, David, 2001. "Bidding for the Surplus : A Non-cooperative Approach to the Shapley Value," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 100(2), pages 274-294, October.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Kamijo, Yoshio, 2008. "Implementation of weighted values in hierarchical and horizontal cooperation structures," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 56(3), pages 336-349, November.
  2. Slikker, Marco, 2007. "Bidding for surplus in network allocation problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 493-511, November.
  3. Jean-François Caulier & Michel Grabisch & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2013. "An allocation rule for dynamic random network formation processes," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00881125, HAL.
  4. Matsubayashi, Nobuo & Yamakawa, Shigetaka, 2006. "A note on network formation with decay," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 93(3), pages 387-392, December.
  5. Rene van den Brink & Gerard van der Laan & Nigel Moes, 2012. "A Strategic Implementation of the Average Tree Solution for Cycle-Free Graph Games," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers, Tinbergen Institute 12-050/1, Tinbergen Institute.

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