This file is part of IDEAS , which uses RePEc data
[ Papers |
Articles |
Software |
Books |
Chapters |
Authors |
Institutions |
JEL Classification |
NEP reports |
Search |
New papers by email |
Author registration |
Rankings |
Volunteers |
FAQ |
Blog |
Help! ]
The Role of Trust in Costly Network Formation Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Sudipta Sarangi
Robert P. Gilles
Additional information is available for the following
registered author(s):
We investigate game theoretic models of entwork formation that are based on individual actions only. Our approach is grounded in three simple and realistic principles. (1) Link formation should be a binary process of consent. (2) Link formation should be costly. (3) The class of network payoff functions should be as general as possible. We provide charecterizations of stable networks under the hypothesis of mutual consent for the case of two-sided and one-sided link formation costs. Furthermore, we introduce a new eqilibrium concept based on a limited, realistic form of farsightedness or (myopic) ''trust'' in network formation. We provide comparisons of the resulting networks with networks satisfying well known stability concepts developed in the literature
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page . Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Paper provided by Econometric Society in its series Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings with number
483.
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
(with abstract ),
plain text
(with abstract ),
BibTeX ,
RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite),
ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 11 Aug 2004Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ecm:nasm04:483Contact details of provider: Phone: 1 212 998 3820 Fax: 1 212 995 4487 Email: Web page: http://www.econometricsociety.org/pastmeetings.asp More information through EDIRC
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).
Keywords: Social networks ; individual stability ; pairwsie stability ; trust ; Other versions of this item:
Find related papers by JEL classification: C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports :
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: Sergio Currarini & Massimo Morelli, 2000.
"Network Formation with Sequential Demands ,"
Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics
99/2, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London, revised Feb 2000.
[Downloadable!]
Matthew O. Jackson & Anne van den Nouweland, 2002.
"Strongly Stable Networks ,"
Microeconomics
0211006, EconWPA.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Matthew O. Jackson & Anne van den Nouweland, 2001.
"Strongly Stable Networks ,"
University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers
2001-3, University of Oregon Economics Department, revised 15 Nov 2002.
[Downloadable!] Jackson, Matthew O. & van den Nouweland, Anne, 2002.
"Strongly Stable Networks ,"
Working Papers
1147, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
[Downloadable!] Jackson, Matthew O. & van den Nouweland, Anne, 2005.
"Strongly stable networks ,"
Games and Economic Behavior ,
Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 420-444, May.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Michael McBride, 2003.
"Position-Specific Informtion in Social Networks ,"
Levine's Bibliography
506439000000000265, UCLA Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Frank H. Page Jr. & Myrna H. Wooders & Samir Kamat, 2002.
"Networks and Farsighted Stability ,"
Computing in Economics and Finance 2002
370, Society for Computational Economics.
Other versions:
Samir Kamat & Frank Page & Myrna Wooders, 2004.
"Networks and Farsighted Stability ,"
Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings
561, Econometric Society.
Page Jr. Frank H & Wooders, Myrna & Kamat, Samir, 2003.
"Networks and Farsighted Stability ,"
The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS)
689, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!] Page Jr, Frank H & Wooders, Myrna H. & Kamat, Samir, 2002.
"Networks And Farsighted Stability ,"
The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS)
660, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!] Page Jr, Frank H & Wooders, Myrna H & Kamat, Samir, 2001.
"Networks And Farsighted Stability ,"
The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS)
621, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!] Page, Frank Jr. & Wooders, Myrna H. & Kamat, Samir, 2005.
"Networks and farsighted stability ,"
Journal of Economic Theory ,
Elsevier, vol. 120(2), pages 257-269, February.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Ui, Takashi, 2000.
"A Shapley Value Representation of Potential Games ,"
Games and Economic Behavior ,
Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 121-135, April.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Venkatesh Bala & Sanjeev Goyal, 2000.
"A Noncooperative Model of Network Formation ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 68(5), pages 1181-1230, September.
Matthew O. Jackson, 2003.
"Allocation Rules for Network Games ,"
Working Papers
1160, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Matthew O. Jackson, 2003.
"Allocation Rules for Network Games ,"
Game Theory and Information
0303010, EconWPA.
[Downloadable!] Matthew O. Jackson, 2003.
"Allocation Rules for Network Games ,"
Working Papers
2003.51, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
[Downloadable!] Jackson, Matthew O., 2005.
"Allocation rules for network games ,"
Games and Economic Behavior ,
Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 128-154, April.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Slikker, M. & Nouweland, A. van den, 1999.
"Network formation models with costs for establishing links ,"
Research Memorandum
771, Tilburg University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration.
[Downloadable!]
Matthew O. Jackson, 2003.
"A Survey of Models of Network Formation: Stability and Efficiency ,"
Game Theory and Information
0303011, EconWPA.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Rod Garratt & Cheng-Zhong Qin, 2003.
"On cooperation structures resulting from simultaneous proposals ,"
Economics Bulletin ,
Economics Bulletin, vol. 3(5), pages 1-9.
[Downloadable!]
Bhaskar Dutta & Suresh Mutuswami, 1997.
"Stable Networks ,"
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers
97-039/1, Tinbergen Institute.
Other versions:
Dutta, Bhaskar & Mutuswami, Suresh, 1996.
"Stable Networks ,"
Working Papers
971, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
[Downloadable!] Dutta, Bhaskar & Mutuswami, Suresh, 1997.
"Stable Networks ,"
Journal of Economic Theory ,
Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 322-344, October.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Stef Tijs & Anne van den Nouweland & Bhaskar Dutta, 1998.
"Link formation in cooperative situations ,"
International Journal of Game Theory ,
Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 245-256.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Hans Haller & Sudipta Sarangi, 2003.
"Nash Networks with Heterogeneous Agents ,"
Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin
337, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Watts, Alison, 2001.
"A Dynamic Model of Network Formation ,"
Games and Economic Behavior ,
Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 331-341, February.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Monderer, Dov & Shapley, Lloyd S., 1996.
"Potential Games ,"
Games and Economic Behavior ,
Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 124-143, May.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Slikker, Marco & van den Nouweland, Anne, 2001.
"A One-Stage Model of Link Formation and Payoff Division ,"
Games and Economic Behavior ,
Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 153-175, January.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Jackson, Matthew O. & Wolinsky, Asher, 1996.
"A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks ,"
Journal of Economic Theory ,
Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 44-74, October.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Hart, Sergiu & Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1989.
"Potential, Value, and Consistency ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 57(3), pages 589-614, May.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full
references Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Marco A. Marini, 2007.
"An Overview of Coalitions and Networks Formation Models for Economic Applications ,"
Working Papers
0707, CREI Università degli Studi Roma Tre, revised 2007.
[Downloadable!]
Francis Bloch & Matthew Jackson, 2006.
"Definitions of equilibrium in network formation games ,"
International Journal of Game Theory ,
Springer, vol. 34(3), pages 305-318, October.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Gönül Dogan & M.A.L.M. van Assen & Arnout van de Rijt & Vincent Buskens, 2007.
"The Stability of Exchange Networks ,"
Working Papers
2007.66, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
[Downloadable!]
Gilles, R.P. & Chakrabarti, S. & Sarangi, S. & Badasyan, N., 2004.
"The role of middlemen in efficient and strongly pairwise stable networks ,"
Discussion Paper
64, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
[Downloadable!]
Marco Marini, 2007.
"An Overview of Coalition & Network Formation Models for Economic Applications ,"
Working Papers
0712, University of Urbino Carlo Bo, Department of Economics, revised 2007.
[Downloadable!]
Sudipta Sarangi & H. Haller, .
"Nash Networks with Heterogeneous Agents ,"
Departmental Working Papers
2003-06, Department of Economics, Louisiana State University.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Matthew O. Jackson, 2003.
"A survey of models of network formation: Stability and efficiency ,"
Working Papers
1161, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Access and
download statistics Did you know? You can create your own reading lists on IDEAS.
This page was last updated on 2009-11-6.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics , College of Liberal Arts and Sciences , University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics .