Allocation rules for fixed and flexible networks: the role of players and their links
AbstractWe propose an allocation rule that takes into account the importance of players and their links and characterizes it for a fixed network. Unlike previous rules, our characterization does not require component additivity. Next, we extend it to flexible networks a la Jackson (2005). Finally, we provide a comparison with other fixed (network Myerson and Position value) and flexible network (player and link based) allocation rules through a number of examples.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 38340.
Date of creation: 02 Dec 2011
Date of revision:
Network games; Allocation rules; Cooperative games;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation
- A14 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Sociology of Economics
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-05-02 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2012-05-02 (Game Theory)
- NEP-NET-2012-05-02 (Network Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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"Allocation rules for network games,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 128-154, April.
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"The Role of Trust in Costly Network Formation,"
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- Gilles, R.P. & Chakrabarti, S. & Sarangi, S. & Badasyan, N., 2004. "The Role of Middlemen inEfficient and Strongly Pairwise Stable Networks," Discussion Paper 2004-64, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Kamijo, Yoshio, 2009. "A linear proportional effort allocation rule," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 58(3), pages 341-353, November.
- Marco Slikker, 2005. "A characterization of the position value," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 33(4), pages 505-514, November.
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