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An allocation rule for dynamic random network formation processes

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  • Jean-François Caulier

    ()
    (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS : UMR8174 - Université Paris I - Panthéon-Sorbonne)

  • Michel Grabisch

    ()
    (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS : UMR8174 - Université Paris I - Panthéon-Sorbonne, EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics - Ecole d'Économie de Paris)

  • Agnieszka Rusinowska

    ()
    (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS : UMR8174 - Université Paris I - Panthéon-Sorbonne, EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics - Ecole d'Économie de Paris)

Abstract

Most allocation rules for network games presented in the literature assume that the network structure is fixed. We put explicit emphasis on the construction of networks and examine the dynamic formation of networks whose evolution across time periods is stochastic. Time-series of networks are studied that describe processes of network formation where links may appear or disappear at any period. Moreover, convergence to an efficient network is not necessarily prescribed. Transitions from one network to another are random and yield a Markov chain. We propose the link-based allocation rule for such dynamic random network formation processes and provide its axiomatic characterization. By considering a monotone game and a particular (natural) network formation process we recover the link-based flexible network allocation rule of Jackson.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by HAL in its series Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) with number halshs-00881125.

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Date of creation: Aug 2013
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Handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00881125

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Related research

Keywords: Dynamic networks; network game; link-based allocation rule; Markov chain; characterization;

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References

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  14. Frank H. Page, Jr., Myrna H. Wooders, 2009. "Club Networks with Multiple Memberships and Noncooperative Stability," Caepr Working Papers 2009-005, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Economics Department, Indiana University Bloomington.
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  18. Dutta, Bhaskar & Mutuswami, Suresh, 1997. "Stable Networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 322-344, October.
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  23. Bhaskar Dutta & Sayantan Ghosal & Debraj Ray, 2004. "Farsighted Network Formation," Working papers 122, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
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