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An Overview of Coalition & Network Formation Models for Economic Applications

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  • Marco Marini

    ()
    (Università di Urbino "Carlo Bo" & CREI, Roma Tre)

Abstract

This paper presents synthetically some recent developments in the theory of coalition and network formation. For this purpose, some major equilibrium concepts recently introduced to model the formation of coalition structures and networks among players are briefly reviewed and discussed. A few economic applications are also illustrated to give a flavour of the type of predictions such models are able to provide.

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File URL: http://www.econ.uniurb.it/RePEc/urb/wpaper/WP_07_12.pdf
File Function: First version, 2007
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Urbino Carlo Bo, Department of Economics, Society & Politics - Scientific Committee - L. Stefanini & G. Travaglini in its series Working Papers with number 0712.

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Length: 45 pages
Date of creation: 2007
Date of revision: 2007
Handle: RePEc:urb:wpaper:07_12

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Web page: http://www.econ.uniurb.it/
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Related research

Keywords: Coalitions; Networks; Core; Games with Externalities; Endogenous Coalition Formation; Pairwise stability; Stable Networks; Link Formation;

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References

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  23. Matthew O. Jackson & Asher Wolinsky, 1994. "A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks," Discussion Papers 1098, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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