I propose a normal form game of agreement formation in which each player's strategy is to say for each size of agreement whether it is acceptable or not. I propose a refinement, which guarantees that each one of these choices is self-enforcing. For general payoff functions, which exhibit positive externalities, I analyse situations in which symmetric players have the possibility to reach a unique agreement. I prove the uniqueness of this equilibrium. I give two specific examples: a cartel and an agreement to contribute to a public good.
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Find related papers by JEL classification: C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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