Allocation rules for network games
AbstractPrevious allocation rules for network games, such as the Myerson Value, implicitly or explicitly take the network structure as fixed. In many situations, however, the network structure can be altered by players. This means that the value of alternative network structures (not just sub-networks) can and should influence the allocation of value among players on any given network structure. I present a family of allocation rules that incorporate information about alternative network structures when allocating value.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.
Volume (Year): 51 (2005)
Issue (Month): 1 (April)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836
Other versions of this item:
- Matthew O. Jackson, 2003. "Allocation Rules for Network Games," Working Papers 2003.51, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Matthew O. Jackson, 2003. "Allocation Rules for Network Games," Game Theory and Information 0303010, EconWPA.
- Matthew O. Jackson, 2003. "Allocation Rules for Network Games," Working Papers 1160, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- A14 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Sociology of Economics
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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