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original papers : Network formation with sequential demands

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Author Info

  • Sergio Currarini
  • Massimo Morelli

Abstract

This paper introduces a non-cooperative game-theoretic model of sequential network formation, in which players propose links and demand payoffs. Payoff division is therefore endogenous. We show that if the value of networks satisfies size monotonicity, then each and every equilibrium network is efficient. The result holds not only when players make absolute participation demands, but also when they are allowed to make link-specific demands.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Review of Economic Design.

Volume (Year): 5 (2000)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 229-249

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Handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:5:y:2000:i:3:p:229-249

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Related research

Keywords: Link formation; efficient networks; payoff division;

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Cited by:
  1. Matthew O. Jackson, 2003. "Allocation Rules for Network Games," Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences 1160, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  2. McBride, Michael, 2006. "Imperfect monitoring in communication networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 126(1), pages 97-119, January.
  3. Suresh Mutuswami & Eyal Winter, 2001. "Subscription Mechanisms for Network Formation," Discussion Paper Series dp264, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
  4. Johari, Ramesh & Mannor, Shie & Tsitsiklis, John N., 2006. "A contract-based model for directed network formation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 201-224, August.
  5. Jackson, Matthew O. & van den Nouweland, Anne, 2002. "Strongly Stable Networks," Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences 1147, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  6. David Pérez-Castrillo & David Wettstein, 2004. "Forming Efficient Networks," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 609.04, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  7. Mutuswami, Suresh & Perez-Castrillo, David & Wettstein, David, 2004. "Bidding for the surplus: realizing efficient outcomes in economic environments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 111-123, July.
  8. PAPACCIO, Anna, 2013. "Bilateralism and Multilateralism: a Network Approach," CELPE Discussion Papers 125, CELPE - Centre of Labour Economics and Economic Policy, University of Salerno, Italy.
  9. Filippo Vergara Caffarelli, 2009. "Networks with decreasing returns to linking," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers), Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area 734, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.

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