Sergio Currarini
Personal Details
First Name: Sergio
Middle Name:
Last Name: Currarini
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID: pcu4
Email:
Homepage:
http://venus.unive.it/currarin
Postal Address: Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche S. Giobbe 873 30121 Venezia, Italia
Phone:
Affiliation
(in no particular order)Dipartimento di Economia (Department of Economics)
Location: Venezia, Italy
Università Ca' Foscari di Venezia (University Ca' Foscari of Venice)
Homepage: http://www.dse.unive.it/
Email:
Phone: +39-0412349621
Fax: +39-0412349176
Postal: Cannaregio, S. Giobbe no 873 , 30121 Venezia
Handle: RePEc:edi:dsvenit (more details at EDIRC)Scuola Superiore di Economia (SSE-Ca' Foscari) (Advanced School of Economics in Venice)
Location: Venezia, Italy
Homepage: http://venus.unive.it/sse/
Email:
Phone: +39-041-234-9256
Fax: +39-041-234-9176
Postal: Università Ca' Foscari, San Giobbe 873, 30121 Venezia
Handle: RePEc:edi:ssvenit (more details at EDIRC)
Works
Download all references for this author: available formats: HTML (with abstracts), plain text (with abstracts), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Working papers
- Sergio Currarini & Marco Marini, 2011. "Coalitional Approaches to Collusive Agreements in Oligopoly Games," Working Papers 1113, University of Urbino Carlo Bo, Department of Economics, Society & Politics, revised 2011.
- Sergio Currarini & Fernando Vega Redondo, 2010. "Search and Homophily in Social Networks," Working Papers 2010_24, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".
- Sergio Currarini & Marco Marini, 2009. "The Kinked Demand Model and the Stability of Cooperation," Working Papers 0905, University of Urbino Carlo Bo, Department of Economics, Society & Politics, revised 2009.
- Sergio Currarni & Francesco Feri, 2008.
"Information Sharing Networks in Oligopoly,"
Working Papers
2008_16, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".
- Sergio Currarini & Francesco Feri, . "Information Sharing Networks in Oligopoly," Working Papers 2008-13, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck.
- Sergio Currarini & Francesco Feri, 2007.
"Bilateral Information Sharing in Oligopoly,"
Working Papers
2007-15, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck.
- Sergio Currarini & Francesco Feri, 2007. "Bilateral Information Sharing in Oligopoly," Working Papers 2007_21, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".
- Sergio Currarini & Paolo Pin & Matthew O. Jackson, 2007.
"An Economic Model of Friendship: Homophily, Minorities and Segregation,"
Working Papers
2007_20, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".
- Sergio Currarini & Matthew O. Jackson & Paolo Pin, 2009. "An Economic Model of Friendship: Homophily, Minorities, and Segregation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 77(4), pages 1003-1045, 07.
- Sergio Currarini, 2006.
"Network Design in Games with Spillovers,"
Working Papers
2006_16, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".
- Sergio Currarini, 2007. "Network design in games with spillovers," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 10(4), pages 305-326, March.
- Sergio Currarini & Francesco Feri, 2006.
"Delegation Versus Centralization: The Role of Externalities,"
Working Papers
2006_15, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".
- Currarini, Sergio & Feri, Francesco, 2006. "Delegation versus centralization: The role of externalities," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 112-119, June.
- Sergio Currarini, 2006.
"Group Stability of Hierarchies in Games with Spillovers,"
Working Papers
2006_14, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".
- Currarini, Sergio, 2007. "Group stability of hierarchies in games with spillovers," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 54(3), pages 187-202, December.
- Marco Marini & Sergio Currarini, 2004.
"Coalition Formation in Games without Synergies,"
Working Papers
2004.43, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Sergio Currarini & Marco A. Marini, 2006. "Coalition Formation In Games Without Synergies," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 8(01), pages 111-126.
- Sergio Currarini, 2003. "On the Stability of Hierarchies in Games with Externalities," Working Papers 2003.19, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Marini, Marco A. & Currarini, Sergio, 2003. "A sequential approach to the characteristic function and the core in games with externalities," MPRA Paper 1689, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 2003.
- Currarini, Sergio & Marini, Marco A., 2002. "Sequential play and cartel stability in a Cournot oligopoly," MPRA Paper 22137, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Sergio Currarini & Massimo Morelli, 2000. "Network Formation with Sequential Demands," Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics 99/2, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London, revised Feb 2000.
- Currarini, Sergio & Marini, Marco, 1998. "The Core of Games with Stackelberg Leaders," MPRA Paper 22139, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- CURRARINI, Sergio & TULKENS, Henry, 1998. "Core-theoretic and political stability of international agreements on transfrontier pollution," CORE Discussion Papers 1997093, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- BLOISE, Gaetano & CURRARINI, Sergio & KIKIDIS, Nicholas, 1998.
"Inflation, welfare and public goods,"
CORE Discussion Papers
1998037, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Bloise, Gaetano & Currarini, Sergio & Kikidis, Nicholas, 2002. " Inflation, Welfare, and Public Good," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 4(3), pages 369-86.
- CURRARINI , Sergio, 1996. "Ratio equilibria and voting in a public goods economy with jurisdictions," CORE Discussion Papers 1996064, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
Articles
- Currarini, Sergio & Marini, Marco, 2011. "Kinked norms of behaviour and cooperation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 110(3), pages 223-225, March.
- Sergio Currarini & Matthew O. Jackson & Paolo Pin, 2009.
"An Economic Model of Friendship: Homophily, Minorities, and Segregation,"
Econometrica,
Econometric Society, vol. 77(4), pages 1003-1045, 07.
- Sergio Currarini & Paolo Pin & Matthew O. Jackson, 2007. "An Economic Model of Friendship: Homophily, Minorities and Segregation," Working Papers 2007_20, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".
- Currarini, Sergio, 2007.
"Group stability of hierarchies in games with spillovers,"
Mathematical Social Sciences,
Elsevier, vol. 54(3), pages 187-202, December.
- Sergio Currarini, 2006. "Group Stability of Hierarchies in Games with Spillovers," Working Papers 2006_14, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".
- Sergio Currarini, 2007.
"Network design in games with spillovers,"
Review of Economic Design,
Springer, vol. 10(4), pages 305-326, March.
- Sergio Currarini, 2006. "Network Design in Games with Spillovers," Working Papers 2006_16, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".
- Sergio Currarini & Marco A. Marini, 2006.
"Coalition Formation In Games Without Synergies,"
International Game Theory Review (IGTR),
World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 8(01), pages 111-126.
- Marco Marini & Sergio Currarini, 2004. "Coalition Formation in Games without Synergies," Working Papers 2004.43, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Currarini, Sergio & Feri, Francesco, 2006.
"Delegation versus centralization: The role of externalities,"
Research in Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 112-119, June.
- Sergio Currarini & Francesco Feri, 2006. "Delegation Versus Centralization: The Role of Externalities," Working Papers 2006_15, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".
- Currarini, Sergio, 2005. "Voting on federations," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 1-21, March.
- Currarini, Sergio, 2002. "Voting on public goods in multi-jurisdictional systems," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 215-230, June.
- Bloise, Gaetano & Currarini, Sergio & Kikidis, Nicholas, 2002.
" Inflation, Welfare, and Public Good,"
Journal of Public Economic Theory,
Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 4(3), pages 369-86.
- BLOISE, Gaetano & CURRARINI, Sergio & KIKIDIS, Nicholas, 1998. "Inflation, welfare and public goods," CORE Discussion Papers 1998037, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Sergio Currarini & Massimo Morelli, 2000. "original papers : Network formation with sequential demands," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 5(3), pages 229-249.
NEP Fields
9 papers by this author were announced in NEP, and specifically in the following field reports (number of papers):- NEP-BEC: Business Economics (4) 2007-08-08 2008-02-09 2008-07-20 2012-01-25 Author is listed
- NEP-COM: Industrial Competition (5) 2007-08-08 2008-02-09 2008-07-20 2009-09-19 2012-01-25 Author is listed
- NEP-CTA: Contract Theory & Applications (2) 2008-02-09 2008-07-20
- NEP-EVO: Evolutionary Economics (1) 2001-06-14
- NEP-GTH: Game Theory (4) 2008-07-20 2009-09-19 2011-01-30 2012-01-25 Author is listed
- NEP-IND: Industrial Organization (3) 2008-02-09 2008-07-20 2009-09-19 Author is listed
- NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (3) 2007-08-08 2008-02-09 2008-07-20 Author is listed
- NEP-NET: Network Economics (6) 2001-06-14 2007-08-08 2008-02-09 2008-02-09 2008-07-20 2012-01-25 Author is listed
- NEP-REG: Regulation (1) 2001-06-14
- NEP-SOC: Social Norms & Social Capital (3) 2008-02-09 2008-07-20 2011-01-30 Author is listed
- NEP-URE: Urban & Real Estate Economics (2) 2008-02-09 2011-01-30
Statistics
Most cited item
- Sergio Currarini & Paolo Pin & Matthew O. Jackson, 2007. "An Economic Model of Friendship: Homophily, Minorities and Segregation," Working Papers 2007_20, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".
Most downloaded item (past 12 months)
- Sergio Currarini & Marco Marini, 2011. "Coalitional Approaches to Collusive Agreements in Oligopoly Games," Working Papers 1113, University of Urbino Carlo Bo, Department of Economics, Society & Politics, revised 2011.
Access and download statistics for all items
Co-authorship network on CollEc
Corrections
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