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The Core of Games with Stackelberg Leaders

Author

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  • Currarini, Sergio
  • Marini, Marco

Abstract

The traditional representation of cooperative games with transferable utility is based on a "characteristic" function, specifying for each coalition the amount of utility that its members can ensure themselves in the underlying normal form game. This formulation is meant to isolate coalitional decisions, abstracting from the strategic complexity of the cooperation process. However, unless the payoffs of the members of a coalition and of its complement are independent (orthogonal games) or opposite (constant slim games), the characteristic function fails to be well defined^

Suggested Citation

  • Currarini, Sergio & Marini, Marco, 1998. "The Core of Games with Stackelberg Leaders," ISU General Staff Papers 199805010700001042, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:isu:genstf:199805010700001042
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    Cited by:

    1. László Á. Kóczy, 2018. "Partition Function Form Games," Theory and Decision Library C, Springer, number 978-3-319-69841-0, December.
    2. Raúl Bajo-Buenestado & Dodge Cahan, 2015. "Unification of Oligopolistic Markets for a Homogeneous Good in the Presence of an Antitrust Commission," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 239-256, September.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory

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