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Majority Rules and Coalition Stability

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Author Info

  • Sergio Currarini

    ()
    (Department of Economics, Universita' degli Studi di Venezia & University of Bristol)

  • Marco Marini

    ()
    (Department of Computer, Control and Management Engineering, Universita' degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza")

Abstract

We consider a class of symmetric games with externalities across coalitions and show that, under certain regularity conditions, restricting the deviating power to majority guarantees the existence of core-stable allocations. We also show that if majorities can extract resources from minorities, stability requires a supermajority rule, whose threshold is increasing in the extraction power.

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File URL: http://www.dis.uniroma1.it/~bibdis/RePEc/aeg/report/2012-01.pdf
File Function: Revised version, 2012
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Department of Computer, Control and Management Engineering, Universita' degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza" in its series DIAG Technical Reports with number 2012-01.

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Length: 7 pages
Date of creation: Jan 2012
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:aeg:report:2012-01

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Related research

Keywords: Majority Rule; Supermajority; Externalities; Core;

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

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  1. Yi, Sang-Seung, 1997. "Stable Coalition Structures with Externalities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 201-237, August.
  2. Partha Dasgupta & Eric Maskin, 2008. "On The Robustness of Majority Rule," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 6(5), pages 949-973, 09.
  3. Sergio Currarini & Marco A. Marini, 2006. "Coalition Formation In Games Without Synergies," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 8(01), pages 111-126.
  4. Ray, Debraj, 2007. "A Game-Theoretic Perspective on Coalition Formation," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199207954.
  5. Ray, Debraj & Vohra, Rajiv, 1997. "Equilibrium Binding Agreements," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 30-78, March.
  6. Bloch, Francis, 1996. "Sequential Formation of Coalitions in Games with Externalities and Fixed Payoff Division," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 90-123, May.
  7. Hafalir, Isa E., 2007. "Efficiency in coalition games with externalities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 242-258, November.
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