Majority Rules and Coalition Stability
AbstractWe consider a class of symmetric games with externalities across coalitions and show that, under certain regularity conditions, restricting the deviating power to majority guarantees the existence of core-stable allocations. We also show that if majorities can extract resources from minorities, stability requires a supermajority rule, whose threshold is increasing in the extraction power.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Computer, Control and Management Engineering, Universita' degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza" in its series DIAG Technical Reports with number 2012-01.
Length: 7 pages
Date of creation: Jan 2012
Date of revision:
Majority Rule; Supermajority; Externalities; Core;
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-12-10 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2012-12-10 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-2012-12-10 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2012-12-10 (Microeconomics)
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