International Integration and Political Preferences: New Insights from the Recent History of EMU
AbstractMany international treaties and cooperation processes require prospective member countries to achieve given standards in either economic, social or environmental quality. In this paper I explore the effect of such standards on domestic political preferences and outcomes. We argue that risk averse voters are likely to lean more on “safe” policy platforms in response to the increased polarization due to the membership requirement. This is particularly true when failure to join the international coalition implies severe losses. I then use these arguments to interpret the marked shift in political outcomes that took place in the Euro-zone prior to the adoption of the Euro in 2002, and propose a similar key of interpretation for political outcomes in countries that are at risk of exit from the EMU.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei in its journal Review of Environment, Energy and Economics.
Volume (Year): (2012)
Issue (Month): (July)
European Monetary Union; International Integration; Political Preferences;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- F50 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - General
- F59 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - Other
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