Ratio equilibria and voting in a public goods economy with jurisdictions
Abstract1n two related papers, Kaneko (1977, 1977a) hILS proved an equivalence theorem relating the set of ratio equilibria of a public goods economy to the core of a strong voting game. This paper extends in two ways Kaneko's analysis to economies with jurisdictions, each producing a specific public good. First, for economies in which a central authority exists, we provide sufficient conditions on the voting rules and on the institutional set-up for Kaneko's equivalence result to generalize. Next, for economies with independent jurisdictions, we propose a conceptof (noncooperative) equilbrium and prove the nonemptiness of the set of equilibrium allocations under the assumption that each public good is non inferior in the jurisdiction producing it. For this case, we also study a oooperation process among independent jurisdictions.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers with number 1996064.
Date of creation: 01 Dec 1996
Date of revision:
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More information through EDIRC
Ratio Equilibrium; Voting; Core; Public Goods; Jurisdictions;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
- H73 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects
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