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Forming efficient networks

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  • Perez-Castrillo, David
  • Wettstein, David

Abstract

In this paper, we suggest a simple sequential mechanism whose subgame perfect equilibria give rise to efficient networks. Moreover, the payoffs received by the agents coincide with their Shapley value in an appropriately defined cooperative game.

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V84-4F3NY1G-4/2/a327b8369cb26afd98795c0dd37b68bd
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.

Volume (Year): 87 (2005)
Issue (Month): 1 (April)
Pages: 83-87

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Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:87:y:2005:i:1:p:83-87

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet

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References

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  1. Jackson, Matthew O. & Wolinsky, Asher, 1996. "A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 44-74, October.
  2. Perez-Castrillo, David & Wettstein, David, 2001. "Bidding for the Surplus : A Non-cooperative Approach to the Shapley Value," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 100(2), pages 274-294, October.
  3. Mutuswami, Suresh & Perez-Castrillo, David & Wettstein, David, 2004. "Bidding for the surplus: realizing efficient outcomes in economic environments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 111-123, July.
  4. Matthew O. Jackson, 2003. "Allocation Rules for Network Games," Working Papers 2003.51, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  5. MUTUSWAMI, Suresh & WINTER, Eyal, 2000. "Subscription mechanisms for network formation," CORE Discussion Papers 2000020, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  6. Sergio Currarini & Massimo Morelli, 2000. "original papers : Network formation with sequential demands," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 5(3), pages 229-249.
  7. Dutta, Bhaskar & Mutuswami, Suresh, 1996. "Stable Networks," Working Papers 971, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Jean-François Caulier & Michel Grabisch & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2013. "An allocation rule for dynamic random network formation processes," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 13063, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
  2. Kamijo, Yoshio, 2008. "Implementation of weighted values in hierarchical and horizontal cooperation structures," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 56(3), pages 336-349, November.
  3. Slikker, Marco, 2007. "Bidding for surplus in network allocation problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 493-511, November.
  4. Rene van den Brink & Gerard van der Laan & Nigel Moes, 2012. "A Strategic Implementation of the Average Tree Solution for Cycle-Free Graph Games," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 12-050/1, Tinbergen Institute.
  5. Matsubayashi, Nobuo & Yamakawa, Shigetaka, 2006. "A note on network formation with decay," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 93(3), pages 387-392, December.

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