A linear proportional effort allocation rule
AbstractThis paper proposes a new class of allocation rules in network games. Like the solution theory in cooperative games of how the Harsanyi dividend of each coalition is distributed among a set of players, this new class of allocation rules focuses on the distribution of the dividend of each network. The dividend of each network is allocated in proportion to some measure of each player's effort, which is called an effort function. With linearity of the allocation rules, an allocation rule is specified by the effort functions. These types of allocation rules are called linear proportional effort allocation rules. Two famous allocation rules, the Myerson value and the position value, belong to this class of allocation rules. In this study, we provide a unifying approach to define the two aforementioned values. Moreover, we provide an axiomatic analysis of this class of allocation rules, and axiomatize the Myerson value, the position value, and their non-symmetric generalizations in terms of effort functions. We propose a new allocation rule in network games that also belongs to this class of allocation rules.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Mathematical Social Sciences.
Volume (Year): 58 (2009)
Issue (Month): 3 (November)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505565
Network games Linear proportional effort allocation rules Axiomatization Myerson value Position value;
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