This paper presents a model in which relative standing determines standards. There are three kinds of agents in the model: candidates who wish to pass a test, members of the elite who have passed the test, and the judge who decides who passes. In order to pass, a candidate's performance must be at least as god as the performance of a representative member of the elite. Without perturbations in the underlying data, the model predicts that standards will not change. Perturbations in the preferences used to judge candidates lead to a reduction in standards. Copyright 2000 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.
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Article provided by Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association in its journal International Economic Review.
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