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Voting for Voters: A Model of Electoral Evolution Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Barbera, S.
Maschler, M.
Shalev, J.
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior .
Volume (Year): 37 (2001)
Issue (Month): 1 (October)
Pages: 40-78
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Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:37:y:2001:i:1:p:40-78Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836
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Keywords: Other versions of this item:
Paper Salvador Barberà & Michael Maschler & Jonathan Shalev, 1998.
"Voting for Voters: A Model of Electoral Evolution ,"
Game Theory and Information
9804001, EconWPA.
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"Voting for voters: a model of electoral evolution ,"
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[Downloadable!] References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: Barbera, Salvador & Sonnenschein, Hugo & Zhou, Lin, 1991.
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Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 595-609, May.
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