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The Politics of Cooptation

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Author Info
Bertocchi, Graziella
Spagat, Michael

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Abstract

Group 1 holds political power. Group 2 threatens this power. Group 1 decreases the upheaval probability by co-opting some agents from Group 2 into a more benign Group 3. Improvements in upheaval technology lead to less co-optation. Increasing the relative size of Group 1 implies larger co-optation payments to a smaller group, decreasing the total resources committed to co-optation. In an extension in which Group 3 also threatens Group 1, although less destructively than does Group 2, co-optation transfers are reduced. Growth causes political stabilization. The theory applies to the origin of the welfare state, post-communist privatization and other situations.

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Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 2156.

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Date of creation: May 1999
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Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:2156

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Related research
Keywords: Cooptation Privatization Upheaval Welfare State

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D3 - Microeconomics - - Distribution
D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
H3 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents
P26 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Systems and Transition Economies - - - Political Economy

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Alesina, Alberto, et al, 1996. " Political Instability and Economic Growth," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 189-211, June.
    Other versions:
  2. Robinson, James A., 1999. "When is a State Predatory?," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH.
  3. Jody Overland & Michael Spagat, 1998. "Political Instability, Foreign Investment and Growth in Proprietary Economies," Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics 98/8, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London, revised 17 Feb 1998. [Downloadable!]
  4. Roemer, John E, 1985. "Rationalizing Revolutionary Ideology," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(1), pages 85-108, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, 2000. "Why Did The West Extend The Franchise? Democracy, Inequality, And Growth In Historical Perspective," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 115(4), pages 1167-1199, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Grossman, Herschel I, 1994. "Production, Appropriation, and Land Reform," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 705-12, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Biais, Bruno & Perotti, Enrico C, 1998. "Machiavellian Underpricing," CEPR Discussion Papers 2014, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Grossman, Herschel I, 1991. "A General Equilibrium Model of Insurrections," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(4), pages 912-21, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Horowitz, Andrew W, 1993. "Time Paths of Land Reform: A Theoretical Model of Reform Dynamics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(4), pages 1003-10, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Graziella Bertocchi, 2007. "The Enfranchisement of Women and the Welfare State," IZA Discussion Papers 2922, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Amihai Glazer & Mark Gradstein, 2001. "Appropriation, Human Capital, and Mandatory Schooling," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
  3. Overland, Jody & Simons, Kenneth L & Spagat, Michael, 2000. "Political Instability and Growth in Dictatorships," CEPR Discussion Papers 2653, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Gradstein, Mark & Schiff, Maurice, 2004. "The Political Economy of Social Exclusion with Implications for Immigration Policy," IZA Discussion Papers 1087, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Bertocchi, Graziella, 2003. "The Law of Primogeniture and the Transition from Landed Aristocracy to Industrial Democracy," CEPR Discussion Papers 3723, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Graziella Bertocchi, 2007. "The Vanishing Bequest Tax: The Comparative Evolution of Bequest Taxation in Historical Perspective," IZA Discussion Papers 2578, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Gradstein, Mark, 2004. "Inequality, Democracy and the Emergence of Institutions," CEPR Discussion Papers 4187, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Lazarev, Valery, 2007. "Political labor market, government policy, and stability of a non-democratic regime," MPRA Paper 2352, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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