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The Coevolution of Economic and Political Development from Monarchy to Democracy

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Author Info
Fali Huang () (School of Economics, Singapore Management University)

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Abstract

This paper establishes a simple model of long run economic and political development, which is driven by the inherent technical features of different production factors and the political conflicts among factor owners on how to divide the outputs. The main production factor in economy evolves from land to physical capital and then to human capital, which enables their respective owners (landlords, capitalists, and workers) to gain political power in the same sequence, shaping the political development path from monarchy to oligarchy and ?finally to democracy with full suffrage. When it is too costly for any group of factor owners to repress others, political compromise is reached and economic progress is not blocked; otherwise, the political conflicts may lead to economic stagnation.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Singapore Management University, School of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 07-2007.

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Length: 37 pages
Date of creation: May 2007
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Publication status: Published in SMU Economics and Statistics Working Paper Series
Handle: RePEc:siu:wpaper:07-2007

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Related research
Keywords: Economic Development; Political Development; Democratization; Class Structure; Land; Physical Capital; Human Capital; Monarchy; Oligarchy; Democracy; Suffrage Extension.;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
O10 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - General
O40 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - General
P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism
N10 - Economic History - - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics; Growth and Fluctuations - - - General, International, or Comparative

References listed on IDEAS
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  3. Oded Galor & Omer Moav, 2004. "From Physical to Human Capital Accumulation: Inequality and the Process of Development," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 71(4), pages 1001-1026, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Edward L. Glaeser & Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 2004. "Do Institutions Cause Growth?," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 9(3), pages 271-303, 09. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Justman, Moshe & Gradstein, Mark, 1999. "The Industrial Revolution, Political Transition, and the Subsequent Decline in Inequality in 19th-Century Britain," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 109-127, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  19. Jack, William & Lagunoff, Roger, 2006. "Dynamic enfranchisement," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(4-5), pages 551-572, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  20. Goldin, Claudia, 2001. "The Human-Capital Century And American Leadership: Virtues Of The Past," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 61(02), pages 263-292, June. [Downloadable!]
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  24. Dani Rodrik & Arvind Subramanian & Francesco Trebbi, 2004. "Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions Over Geography and Integration in Economic Development," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 9(2), pages 131-165, 06. [Downloadable!]
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  25. Grossman, Herschel I., 2002. ""Make us a king": anarchy, predation, and the state," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 31-46, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Casey B. Mulligan & Kevin K. Tsui, 2008. "Political Entry, Public Policies, and the Economy," NBER Working Papers 13830, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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