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The Coevolution of Economic and Political Development

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Author Info
Fali Huang

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Abstract

This paper establishes a simple model of long run economic and political development, which is driven by the inherent technical features of different factors in production, and political conflicts among factor owners on how to divide the outputs. The main capital form in economy evolves from land to physical capital and then to human capital, which enables the respective factor owners (landlords, capitalists, and workers) to gain political powers in the same sequence, shaping the political development path from monarchy to elite ruling and finally to full suffrage. When it is too costly for any group of factor owners to repress others, political compromise is reached and economic progress is not blocked; otherwise, the political conflicts may lead to economic stagnation.

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File URL: http://www.ifw-kiel.de/VRCent/DEGIT/paper/degit_11/C011_066.pdf
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Paper provided by DEGIT, Dynamics, Economic Growth, and International Trade in its series DEGIT Conference Papers with number c011_066.

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Length: 30 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:deg:conpap:c011_066

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Related research
Keywords: Economic Development Political Development Class Structure Land Physical Capital Human Capital Monarchy Suffrage Extension

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
O10 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - General
O40 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - General
P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism
N10 - Economic History - - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics; Growth and Fluctuations - - - General, International, or Comparative

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  1. Grossman, Herschel I & Kim, Minseong, 1995. "Swords or Plowshares? A Theory of the Security of Claims to Property," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(6), pages 1275-88, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Oded Galor & Omer Moav, 2004. "From Physical to Human Capital Accumulation: Inequality and the Process of Development," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 71(4), pages 1001-1026, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Edward L. Glaeser & Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 2004. "Do Institutions Cause Growth?," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 9(3), pages 271-303, 09. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, 2001. "A Theory of Political Transitions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(4), pages 938-963, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Oded Galor & David N. Weil, 2000. "Population, Technology, and Growth: From Malthusian Stagnation to the Demographic Transition and Beyond," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(4), pages 806-828, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Oded Galor & Omer Moav, 2006. "Das Human-Kapital: A Theory of the Demise of the Class Structure," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 73(1), pages 85-117, 01. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, 2000. "Why Did The West Extend The Franchise? Democracy, Inequality, And Growth In Historical Perspective," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 115(4), pages 1167-1199, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Bertocchi, Graziella, 2004. "Growth, History and Institutions," CEPR Discussion Papers 4738, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Alessandro Lizzeri & Nicola Persico, 2004. "Why Did the Elites Extend the Suffrage? Democracy and the Scope of Government, With an Application to Britain's "Age of Reform"," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 119(2), pages 705-763, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Matthias Doepke & Fabizio Zilibotti, 2006. "Patience Capital, Occupational Choice, and the Spirit of Capitalism," UCLA Economics Working Papers 848, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  11. Engerman, Stanley L. & Sokoloff, Kenneth L., 2005. "The Evolution of Suffrage Institutions in the New World," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 65(04), pages 891-921, November. [Downloadable!]
  12. Huber, Evelyne & Rueschemeyer, Dietrich & Stephens, John D, 1993. "The Impact of Economic Development on Democracy," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 7(3), pages 71-85, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Gary D. Hansen & Edward C. Prescott, 2002. "Malthus to Solow," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 1205-1217, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  14. Goldin, Claudia, 2001. "The Human-Capital Century And American Leadership: Virtues Of The Past," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 61(02), pages 263-292, August. [Downloadable!]
  15. Graziella Bertocchi, 2006. "The Law of Primogeniture and the Transition from Landed Aristocracy to Industrial Democracy," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 43-70, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  16. North, Douglass C, 1991. "Institutions," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 5(1), pages 97-112, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Humberto Llavador & Robert J. Oxoby, 2005. "Partisan Competition, Growth, and the Franchise," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 120(3), pages 1155-1192, August.
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  18. Claudia Goldin, 2001. "The Human Capital Century and American Leadership: Virtues of the Past," NBER Working Papers 8239, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Grossman, Herschel I., 2002. ""Make us a king": anarchy, predation, and the state," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 31-46, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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