Rent Preservation and the Persistence of Underdevelopment
AbstractWhen citizens in a poor constrained society are unequally endowed, they are likely to find it hard to agree on reforms, even though the status quo hurts them collectively. Each citizen group or constituency prefers reforms that expand its opportunities, but in an unequal society, this will typically hurt another constituency's rents. Competitive rent preservation ensures no comprehensive reform path may command broad support. The roots of underdevelopment may therefore lie in the natural tendency toward rent preservation in a divided society. (JEL D72, O10, O17)
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics.
Volume (Year): 1 (2009)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- O10 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - General
- O17 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Enrico Perotti, 2013. "The Political Economy of Finance," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 13-034/IV/DSF53, Tinbergen Institute.
- Chaudhary, Latika & Rubin, Jared, 2011. "Reading, writing, and religion: Institutions and human capital formation," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 17-33, March.
- Galor, Oded, 2012.
"Inequality, Human Capital Formation and the Process of Development,"
IZA Discussion Papers
6328, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Oded Galor, 2011. "Inequality, Human Capital Formation and the Process of Development," Working Papers 2011-7, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Oded Galor, 2011. "Inequality, Human Capital Formation and the Process of Development," NBER Working Papers 17058, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Devarajan, Shantayanan & Khemani, Stuti & Walton, Michael, 2011.
"Civil Society, Public Action and Accountability in Africa,"
Working Paper Series
rwp11-036, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
- Walton, Michael & Devarajan, Shantayanan & Khemani, Stuti, 2011. "Civil Society, Public Action and Accountability in Africa," Scholarly Articles 5131503, Harvard Kennedy School of Government.
- Devarajan, Shantayanan & Khemani, Stuti & Walton, Michael, 2011. "Civil society, public action and accountability in Africa," Policy Research Working Paper Series 5733, The World Bank.
- Raghuram G. Rajan & Rodney Ramcharan, 2011.
"Land and Credit: A Study of the Political Economy of Banking in the United States in the Early 20th Century,"
Journal of Finance,
American Finance Association, vol. 66(6), pages 1895-1931, December.
- Raghuram G. Rajan & Rodney Ramcharan, 2009. "Land and Credit: A Study of the Political Economy of Banking in the United States in the Early 20th Century," NBER Working Papers 15083, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Campos, Nauro F. & Coricelli, Fabrizio, 2009.
"Financial liberalization and democracy: The role of reform reversals,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
7393, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Campos, Nauro F & Coricelli, Fabrizio, 2009. "Financial Liberalization and Democracy: The Role of Reform Reversals," IZA Discussion Papers 4338, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Oded Galor, 2009. "Inequality and Economic Development: An Overview," Working Papers 2009-3, Brown University, Department of Economics.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jane Voros) or (Michael P. Albert).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.