Rent Preservation and the Persistence of Underdevelopment
AbstractWhen citizens in a poor constrained society are unequally endowed, they are likely to find it hard to agree on reforms, even though the status quo hurts them collectively. Each citizen group or constituency prefers reforms that expand its opportunities, but in an unequal society, this will typically hurt another constituency's rents. Competitive rent preservation ensures no comprehensive reform path may command broad support. The roots of underdevelopment may therefore lie in the natural tendency toward rent preservation in a divided society. (JEL D72, O10, O17)
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics.
Volume (Year): 1 (2009)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- O10 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - General
- O17 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Hausmann, Ricardo & Rodrik, Dani, 2002.
"Economic Development as Self Discovery,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
3356, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Hausmann, Ricardo & Rodrik, Dani, 2002. "Economic Development as Self-Discovery," Working Paper Series rwp02-023, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
- Ricardo Hausmann & Dani Rodrik, 2002. "Economic Development as Self-Discovery," NBER Working Papers 8952, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Avinash Dixit & John Londregan, 1998. "Ideology, Tactics, And Efficiency In Redistributive Politics," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 113(2), pages 497-529, May.
- Karla Hoff, 2003. "Paths of Institutional Development: A View from Economic History," World Bank Research Observer, World Bank Group, vol. 18(2), pages 205-226.
- Abhijit Banerjee & Lakshmi Iyer, 2005.
"History, Institutions, and Economic Performance: The Legacy of Colonial Land Tenure Systems in India,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 1190-1213, September.
- Abhijit Banerjee & Lakshmi Iyer, 2010. "History Institutions and Economic Performance: The Legacy of Colonial Land Tenure Systems in India," Working Papers id:2811, eSocialSciences.
- North, Douglass C. & Weingast, Barry R., 1989. "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(04), pages 803-832, December.
- Hans P. Binswanger & Klaus Deininger, 1997.
"Explaining Agricultural and Agrarian Policies in Developing Countries,"
Journal of Economic Literature,
American Economic Association, vol. 35(4), pages 1958-2005, December.
- Binswanger, Hans P. & Deininger, Klaus, 1997. "Explaining agricultural and agrarian policies in developing countries," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1765, The World Bank.
- Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, 2005. "The Economic Effects of Constitutions," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262661926, December.
- Marshall, Alfred, 1890. "The Principles of Economics," History of Economic Thought Books, McMaster University Archive for the History of Economic Thought, number marshall1890.
- Campos, Nauro F & Coricelli, Fabrizio, 2009.
"Financial Liberalization and Democracy: The Role of Reform Reversals,"
IZA Discussion Papers
4338, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Campos, Nauro F. & Coricelli, Fabrizio, 2009. "Financial liberalization and democracy: The role of reform reversals," CEPR Discussion Papers 7393, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Gall, Thomas & Masella, Paolo, 2011.
"Markets and Jungles,"
Proceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, Berlin 2011
30, Verein für Socialpolitik, Research Committee Development Economics.
- Thomas Gall & Paolo Masella, 2009. "Markets and Jungles," Boston University - Department of Economics - The Institute for Economic Development Working Papers Series dp-187, Boston University - Department of Economics.
- Andreas Madestam, 2009.
"Informal Finance: A Theory of Moneylenders,"
2009.69, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Oded Galor, 2009. "Inequality and Economic Development: An Overview," Working Papers 2009-3, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Devarajan, Shantayanan & Khemani, Stuti & Walton, Michael, 2011.
"Civil Society, Public Action and Accountability in Africa,"
Working Paper Series
rwp11-036, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
- Walton, Michael & Devarajan, Shantayanan & Khemani, Stuti, 2011. "Civil Society, Public Action and Accountability in Africa," Scholarly Articles 5131503, Harvard Kennedy School of Government.
- Devarajan, Shantayanan & Khemani, Stuti & Walton, Michael, 2011. "Civil society, public action and accountability in Africa," Policy Research Working Paper Series 5733, The World Bank.
- Chaudhary, Latika & Rubin, Jared, 2011. "Reading, writing, and religion: Institutions and human capital formation," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 17-33, March.
- Raghuram G. Rajan & Rodney Ramcharan, 2009.
"Land and Credit: A Study of the Political Economy of Banking in the United States in the Early 20th Century,"
NBER Working Papers
15083, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Raghuram G. Rajan & Rodney Ramcharan, 2011. "Land and Credit: A Study of the Political Economy of Banking in the United States in the Early 20th Century," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 66(6), pages 1895-1931, December.
- Oded Galor, 2011.
"Inequality, Human Capital Formation and the Process of Development,"
2011-7, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Galor, Oded, 2012. "Inequality, Human Capital Formation and the Process of Development," IZA Discussion Papers 6328, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Oded Galor, 2011. "Inequality, Human Capital Formation and the Process of Development," NBER Working Papers 17058, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- repec:hal:cesptp:halshs-00967428 is not listed on IDEAS
- Enrico Perotti, 2013. "The Political Economy of Finance," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 13-034/IV/DSF53, Tinbergen Institute.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jane Voros) or (Michael P. Albert).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.