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When is a State Predatory?

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  • James A. Robinson

Abstract

I argue that whether or not a state is "predatory" hinges on the relationship between development and the distribution of political power in society. Development is typically inconsistent with the preservation of the political status quo and this gives those who initially hold political power an incentive to oppose it. I show that, contrary to the conventional wisdom, the likelihood of predatory behaviour may be positively related to the extent to which a regime is encompassing and values the future. The model also predicts that the lower is the level of income, and the more unequal is society, the more likely the state is to be predatory. Initial inequality, since it influences the likelihood of political transition, is a crucial determinant of policy choice. I also show how factor endowments influence policy: states in economies relatively endowed with natural resources, or where the elite's wealth is concentrated in land, are more likely to be predatory.

Suggested Citation

  • James A. Robinson, 1999. "When is a State Predatory?," CESifo Working Paper Series 178, CESifo.
  • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_178
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    Cited by:

    1. Joel Guttman & Rafael Reuveny, 2014. "On revolt and endogenous economic policy in autocratic regimes," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 159(1), pages 27-52, April.
    2. Konrad, Kai A., 2002. "Investment in the absence of property rights; the role of incumbency advantages," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(8), pages 1521-1537, September.
    3. Amegashie, J. Atsu, 2008. "Autocratic rule in ethnically-diverse societies," MPRA Paper 8933, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Garfinkel, Michelle R. & Skaperdas, Stergios, 2007. "Economics of Conflict: An Overview," Handbook of Defense Economics, in: Keith Hartley & Todd Sandler (ed.), Handbook of Defense Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 22, pages 649-709, Elsevier.
    5. Guriev, Sergei & Sonin, Konstantin, 2009. "Dictators and oligarchs: A dynamic theory of contested property rights," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(1-2), pages 1-13, February.
    6. Jody Overland & Kenneth Simons & Michael Spagat, 2005. "Political instability and growth in dictatorships," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 125(3), pages 445-470, December.
    7. Zingales, Luigi & Rajan, Raghuram G., 2006. "The Persistence of Underdevelopment: Institutions, Human Capital, or Constituencies?," Working Papers 209, The University of Chicago Booth School of Business, George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State.
    8. Benno J. Ndulu & Stephen A. O'Connell, 1999. "Governance and Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 13(3), pages 41-66, Summer.
    9. Hans-Werner Sinn, 1999. "Inflation and Welfare: Comment on Robert Lucas," NBER Working Papers 6979, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Andrew T. Young, 2016. "What does it take for a roving bandit settle down? Theory and an illustrative history of the Visigoths," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 168(1), pages 75-102, July.
    11. Daron Acemoglu & Davide Ticchi & Andrea Vindigni, 2011. "Emergence And Persistence Of Inefficient States," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 9(2), pages 177-208, April.
    12. Jonathan H. Conning & James A. Robinson, 2001. "Land Reform and the Political Organization of Agriculture," Department of Economics Working Papers 2001-10, Department of Economics, Williams College.
    13. Pranab Bardhan & Dilip Mookherjee, 2005. "Decentralization, Corruption and Government Accountability: An Overview," Boston University - Department of Economics - The Institute for Economic Development Working Papers Series dp-152, Boston University - Department of Economics.
    14. Christopher J. Ellis & John Fender, 2014. "Public Sector Capital and the Transition from Dictatorship to Democracy," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 82(3), pages 322-346, June.
    15. Raghuram G. Rajan, 2009. "Rent Preservation and the Persistence of Underdevelopment," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 1(1), pages 178-218, January.
    16. Bertocchi, Graziella & Spagat, Michael, 2001. "The Politics of Co-optation," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 591-607, December.
    17. Sham N. Kashyap, 2022. "How do Panchayats Work? Exploring Clientelistic and Programmatic Transactions in Gram Panchayats of Karnataka," Indian Journal of Human Development, , vol. 16(3), pages 479-492, December.
    18. Daron Acemoglu, 2006. "Modeling Inefficient Institutions," NBER Working Papers 11940, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    19. Mr. Guido De Blasio & Mr. A. Dalmazzo, 2001. "Resources and Incentives to Reform: A Model and Some Evidence on Sub-Saharan African Countries," IMF Working Papers 2001/086, International Monetary Fund.
    20. Ashok Chakravarti, 2012. "Institutions, Economic Performance and the Visible Hand," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 14751.
    21. Temple, Jonathan, 2001. "Growing into Trouble: Indonesia After 1966," CEPR Discussion Papers 2932, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    22. Veselin Draskovic & Sergey A. Kravchenko & Milica Delibasic, 2021. "Synergy of Neoliberalism, Alternative Institutions and Transitional Crisis," The AMFITEATRU ECONOMIC journal, Academy of Economic Studies - Bucharest, Romania, vol. 23(57), pages 534-534.
    23. James A. Robinson & Daron Acemoglu, 2000. "Political Losers as a Barrier to Economic Development," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(2), pages 126-130, May.

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