The Politics of Co-optation
AbstractGroup 1 holds political power. Group 2 threatens this power. Group 1 decreases the upheaval probability by co-opting some agents from Group 2 into a more benign Group 3. Improvements in upheaval technology lead to less co-optation. Increasing the relative size of Group 1 implies larger co-optation payments to a smaller group, decreasing the total resources committed to co-optation. In an extension in which Group 3 also threatens Group 1, although less destructively than does Group 2, co-optation transfers are reduced. Growth causes political stabilization. The theory applies to the origin of the welfare state, post-communist privatization and other situations.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Comparative Economics.
Volume (Year): 29 (2001)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622864
Other versions of this item:
- D3 - Microeconomics - - Distribution
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
- H3 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents
- P26 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Systems and Transition Economies - - - Political Economy
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