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The role of freedom, growth and religion in the taste for revolution

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  • Robert MacCulloch
  • Silvia Pezzini

Abstract

A fundamental issue for economists is what determines civil conflict. One unsettled question is the relative importance of political freedoms versus economic development. This paper takes a new approach to provide an answer by using micro-data based on surveys of revolutionary preferences of 130,000 people living in 61 nations between 1980 and 1997. Controlling for personal characteristics, country and year fixed effects, more freedom and economic growth both reduce revolutionary support. Losing one level of freedom, equivalent to a shift from the US to Turkey, increases support for revolt by 4 percentage points. To reduce support by the same amount requires adding 14 percentage points on to the GDP growth rate. Being Muslim in a free country has no effect on the probability of supporting revolt compared to a non-religious person. However, being Muslim in a country that is not free increases it by 13 percentage points. Being Christian in a free country decreases the chance of supporting revolt by 4 percentage points, compared to a non-religious person, and in a not-free country by 1 percentage point.

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File URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/6646/
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library in its series LSE Research Online Documents on Economics with number 6646.

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Length: 48 pages
Date of creation: Sep 2002
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:6646

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Keywords: Conflict; freedom; development; growth; religion.;

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Cited by:
  1. David Masclet & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2008. "Punishment, inequality, and welfare : a public good experiment," Post-Print halshs-00196567, HAL.
  2. Fischer, Justina, 2011. "Immigration, integration and terrorism: is there a clash of cultures?," Annual Conference 2011 (Frankfurt, Main): The Order of the World Economy - Lessons from the Crisis 48704, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  3. Klaus Abbink & Silvia Pezzini, 2005. "Determinants of Revolt: Evidence from Survey and Laboratory Data," Discussion Papers, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham 2005-01, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
  4. Berggren, Niclas & Bjørnskov, Christian, 2013. "Does religiosity promote property rights and the rule of law?," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 9(02), pages 161-185, June.
  5. Bruno S. Frey, 2007. "Overprotected Politicians," CESifo Working Paper Series 2019, CESifo Group Munich.
  6. Rajeev Dehejia & Thomas DeLeire & Erzo F.P. Luttmer, 2005. "Insuring Consumption and Happiness Through Religious Organizations," NBER Working Papers 11576, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Bruno S. Frey & Matthias Benz & Alois Stutzer, 2003. "Introducing Procedural Utility: Not only What, but also How Matters," CREMA Working Paper Series 2003-02, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
  8. Yamamura, Eiji, 2013. "Transparency and View Regarding Nuclear Energy Before and After the Fukushima Accident: Evidence on Micro-data," MPRA Paper 46608, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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