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Inequality persistence through vertical vs. horizontal coalitions

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  • Pellicer, Miquel

Abstract

This paper aims to contribute to a better understanding of the observed high persistence of cross-country differences in inequality. It focuses on the interactions between inequality and the predominance of either horizontal coalitions (among individuals of similar economic status) or vertical ones (among individuals with different economic status). A model is proposed showing that the interactions between inequality and the type of coalition formed in a society can give rise to self-sustained social contracts where inequality persists. Key mechanisms of the model are illustrated using the transformation in inequality, redistribution and social relations in Modern England, as well as the "paternalist" system of the US South at the beginning of the XXth century.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Development Economics.

Volume (Year): 90 (2009)
Issue (Month): 2 (November)
Pages: 258-266

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Handle: RePEc:eee:deveco:v:90:y:2009:i:2:p:258-266

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/devec

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Keywords: Inequality Redistribution Working-class Social contracts;

References

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Cited by:
  1. Pellicer, Miquel & Wegner, Eva, 2013. "Electoral Rules and Clientelistic Parties: A Regression Discontinuity Approach," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 8(4), pages 339-371, October.
  2. Miquel Pellicer & Vimal Ranchhod & Mare Sarr & Eva Wegner, 2011. "Inequality Traps in South Africa: An overview and research agenda," SALDRU Working Papers, Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit, University of Cape Town 57, Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit, University of Cape Town.

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