Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Gefangen im Dilemma? Ein strategischer Ansatz der Wahl- und Revolutionsteilnahme

Contents:

Author Info

  • Möller, Marie
Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    Die Abwahl einer Regierung sowie die Entmachtung eines Diktators per Revolution können daran scheitern, dass kein individueller Teilnahmeanreiz besteht. Als Lösungsmöglichkeit wird ein strategischer Ansatz entwickelt, der zeigt, dass sich die Kollektivgutproblematik bei der Wahlteilnahme als ein N Personen Chicken Game darstellen und sich durch die Einführung von selektiven Anreizen lösen lässt, insofern als dass ein Nash- Gleichgewicht existiert, in dem alle einen individuellen Anreiz zur Teilnahme haben. Bei der Revolutionsteilnahme dagegen besteht ein klassisches N Personen Gefangenendilemma, welches in ein Koordinationsproblem überführt werden kann, allerdings nur, wenn das dabei bestehende First-Mover-Problem gelöst wird. Im Ergebnis ist die Machterhaltungsrestriktion in einer Demokratie bindend, in einer Diktatur dagegen nicht. Der Aufsatz liefert damit eine weitere theoretische Erklärung für die positive Korrelation zwischen Demokratie und Wohlstand, die sich im Querschnittsvergleich zeigt. -- The voting out of a government or the disempowerment of a dictator may fail if there is no incentive for the individual to participate. A strategic approach is developed which shows the election-participation-decision as an N person chicken-game. With the introduction of selective benefits, the problem is solved insofar as there is only one Nash-equilibrium in which everyone participates. The participation in a revolution can be represented as an N per-son prisoner's dilemma, which can be transformed into a coordination problem - though only if the first-mover-problem that arises can be solved. The result of the strategic approach is that the stay-in-power-restriction is mandatory for democratic governments only. Therefore this paper provides one more theoretical explanation for the positive correlation between the de-gree of democracy and prosperity in cross section comparisons.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/49981/1/658693247.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by University of Münster, Center for Interdisciplinary Economics (CIW) in its series CIW Discussion Papers with number 3/2011.

    as in new window
    Length:
    Date of creation: 2011
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:zbw:ciwdps:32011

    Contact details of provider:
    Postal: Universitätsstr. 14-16, 48143 Münster
    Phone: 02 51 / 83-2 29 10
    Fax: 02 51 / 83-2 83 99
    Web page: http://www.wiwi.uni-muenster.de/ciw/
    More information through EDIRC

    Related research

    Keywords:

    Find related papers by JEL classification:

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    References

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
    as in new window
    1. Acemoglu, Daron & Robinson, James A, 2002. "The Political Economy of the Kuznets Curve," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(2), pages 183-203, June.
    2. Grossman, Herschel I, 1991. "A General Equilibrium Model of Insurrections," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(4), pages 912-21, September.
    3. Mutsusaka, J.G. & Palda, F., 1991. "The Downsian Voter Meets the Ecological Fallacy," Papers 91-30, Southern California - School of Business Administration.
    4. Acemoglu, Daron & Robinson, James A, 1998. "Why did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality and Growth in Historical Perspective," CEPR Discussion Papers 1797, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, 2001. "A Theory of Political Transitions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(4), pages 938-963, September.
    6. Bode, Otto F. & Tietzel, Manfred & Weber, Marion, 1991. "Die Logik der sanften Revolution," Beiträge zur Ordnungstheorie und Ordnungspolitik, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen & Walter Eucken Institut, Freiburg, Germany, edition 1, volume 127, number urn:isbn:9783161457999, November.
    7. Matsusaka, John G & Palda, Filip, 1999. " Voter Turnout: How Much Can We Explain?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 98(3-4), pages 431-46, March.
    8. Ghosal, Sayantan & Lockwood, Ben, 2003. "Information Aggregation, Costly Voting And Common Values," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 670, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    9. Bryan Caplan, 2007. "Introduction to The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies
      [The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies]
      ," Introductory Chapters, Princeton University Press.
    10. Adam Przeworski & Fernando Limongi, 1993. "Political Regimes and Economic Growth," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 7(3), pages 51-69, Summer.
    11. Blais, Andre & Young, Robert, 1999. " Why Do People Vote? An Experiment in Rationality," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 99(1-2), pages 39-55, April.
    12. Roemer, John E, 1985. "Rationalizing Revolutionary Ideology," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(1), pages 85-108, January.
    13. D. Usher & M. Engineer, 1987. "The distribution of income in a despotic society," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 54(3), pages 261-276, August.
    14. Dan Usher & Merwan Engineer, 1986. "The Distribution of Income in a Despotic Society," Working Papers 653, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
    15. Gordon Tullock, 1971. "The paradox of revolution," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 89-99, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:ciwdps:32011. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (ZBW - German National Library of Economics).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.