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The Distribution of Income in a Despotic Society

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Author Info
Dan Usher
Merwan Engineer

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Abstract

A distribution of income between rulers and subjects, or among ranks in a ruling hierarchy, cannot be derived from considerations of marginal products of owned factors of production. Such a distribution can be derived as a balance of income and violence. Society is organized in ranks, and the ruler provides occupants with incomes just sufficient that it is not in their interest to rebel. To model such behaviour, it is necessary to introduce phenomena normally excluded in economic analysis: combat, violence, mortality rates as a component of the utility function, and a rudimentary technology of control.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Queen's University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 653.

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Length: 29 pages
Date of creation: 1986
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:qed:wpaper:653

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  1. Robert MacCulloch, 2001. "What Makes a Revolution?," STICERD - Development Economics Papers 30, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE. [Downloadable!]
  2. Filip Palda, 2001. "The Economics of Election Campaign Spending Limits," Public Economics 0111011, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2008-8-26.


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