The Distribution of Income in a Despotic Society
AbstractA distribution of income between rulers and subjects, or among ranks in a ruling hierarchy, cannot be derived from considerations of marginal products of owned factors of production. Such a distribution can be derived as a balance of income and violence. Society is organized in ranks, and the ruler provides occupants with incomes just sufficient that it is not in their interest to rebel. To model such behaviour, it is necessary to introduce phenomena normally excluded in economic analysis: combat, violence, mortality rates as a component of the utility function, and a rudimentary technology of control.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Queen's University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 653.
Length: 29 pages
Date of creation: 1986
Date of revision:
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