On Dictatorship, Economic Development and Stability
AbstractThis paper aims to account for varying economic performances and political stability under dictatorship. We argue that economic welfare and social order are the contemporary relevant factors of political regimes’ stability. Societies with low natural level of social order tend to tolerate predatory behavior from dictators in exchange of a provision of civil peace. The fear of anarchy may explain why populations are locked in the worst dictotorship. In contrast, in societies enjoying a relative natural civil peace, dictatorship is less likely to be predatory because low economic welfare may destabilize it.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES) in its series Discussion Papers (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales) with number 2004029.
Date of creation: 01 Oct 2004
Date of revision:
Anarchy; dictatorship; economic development; predation; social order;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government
- H5 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies
- O1 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development
- P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-AFR-2005-02-13 (Africa)
- NEP-ALL-2005-02-13 (All new papers)
- NEP-DEV-2005-02-13 (Development)
- NEP-HPE-2005-02-13 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
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