This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Dictators and Their Viziers: Agency Problems in Dictatorships

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Georgy Egorov ()
Konstantin Sonin ()

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

The possibility of treason by a close associate has been a nightmare of most dictators throughout history. Better informed viziers are also better able to discriminate among potential plotters, and this makes them more risky subordinates for the dictator. To avoid this, dictators, especially which are weak and vulnerable, sacri.ce the competence of their agents, hiring mediocre but loyal subordinates. One reason why democracies generally witness more talented people in the government is the dictator.s inability to commit to the optimal (less than the capital) punishment for those who unsuccessfully plotted to remove him from power. Furthermore, any use of incentive schemes by a dictator is limited by the fact that rewards are conditional on dictator.s own willingness to keep his promises, while punishments are conditional on dictator.s own survival. We model a principalagent game between a dictator and his (probably, few) viziers both in static and dynamic perspectives. The dynamic model allows us to focus on the succession problem the insecure dictators face.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.wdi.umich.edu/files/Publications/WorkingPapers/wp735.pdf
File Format:
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Stephen M. Ross Business School in its series William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series with number wp735.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: pages
Date of creation: 01 Jan 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wdi:papers:2005-735

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 724 E. University Ave. Wyly Hall, Floor 1, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109-1234
Phone: 734 615 4566
Fax: (734) 763-5850
Email:
Web page: http://www.wdi.umich.edu
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Patricia Loh).

Related research
Keywords: dictatorship; formal political theory; principal-agent theory; institutions;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Przeworski, Adam & Limongi, Fernando, 1993. "Political Regimes and Economic Growth," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 7(3), pages 51-69, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Mike Burkart & Fausto Panunzi & Andrei Shleifer, 2002. "Family Firms," NBER Working Papers 8776, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. O'Flaherty, B., 1991. "How to Be a Dictator: The Advantages of Incumbency," Discussion Papers 1991_28, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
  4. Martin C. McGuire & Mancur Olson Jr., 1996. "The Economics of Autocracy and Majority Rule: The Invisible Hand and the Use of Force," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 34(1), pages 72-96, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Edward L. Glaeser & Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 2004. "Do Institutions Cause Growth?," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 9(3), pages 271-303, 09. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. De Long, J Bradford & Shleifer, Andrei, 1993. "Princes and Merchants: European City Growth before the Industrial Revolution," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 36(2), pages 671-702, October.
    Other versions:
  7. Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, 2001. "A Theory of Political Transitions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(4), pages 938-963, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  8. Overland, Jody & Simons, Kenneth L & Spagat, Michael, 2000. "Political Instability and Growth in Dictatorships," CEPR Discussion Papers 2653, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  9. Carrillo, Juan D. & Mariotti, Thomas, 2001. "Electoral competition and politician turnover," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 1-25, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Stephen Morris, 2001. "Political Correctness," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(2), pages 231-265, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  11. Guido Friebel & Michael Raith, 2004. "Abuse of Authority and Hierarchical Communication," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 35(2), pages 224-244, Summer.
  12. Acemoglu, Daron, 2003. "Why not a political Coase theorem? Social conflict, commitment, and politics," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 620-652, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  13. Dmitriy Gershenson & Herschel I. Grossman, 2001. "Cooption and Repression in the Soviet Union," Economics and Politics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 13(1), pages 31-47, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  14. North, Douglass C, 1991. "Institutions," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 5(1), pages 97-112, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Gallego, M. & Pitchik, C., 2004. "An economic theory of leadership turnover," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(12), pages 2361-2382, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  16. Prendergast, Canice & Topel, Robert H, 1996. "Favoritism in Organizations," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 104(5), pages 958-78, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  17. Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson & Thierry Verdier, 2003. "Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule: A Model of Personal Rule," NBER Working Papers 10136, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  18. Glazer, Amihai, 2002. "Allies as rivals: internal and external rent seeking," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 155-162, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Daron Acemoglu & Davide Ticchi & Andrea Vindigni, 2008. "A Theory of Military Dictatorships," NBER Working Papers 13915, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. George Egorov & Konstantin Sonin, 2005. "The Killing Game: Reputation and Knowledge in Non-Democratic Succession," Economics Working Papers 0054, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Ticchi, Davide & Vindigni, Andrea, 2007. "War and Endogenous Democracy," Papers 03-10-2008, Princeton University, Research Program in Political Economy. [Downloadable!]
  4. Daron Acemoglu & Davide Ticchi & Andrea Vindigni, 2006. "Emergence and Persistence of Inefficient States," NBER Working Papers 12748, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Georgy Egorov & Konstantin Sonin, 2005. "The Killing Game: Reputation and Knowledge in Politics of Succession," Game Theory and Information 0505003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  6. Besley, Timothy J. & Kudamatsu, Masayuki, 2007. "Making Autocracy Work," CEPR Discussion Papers 6371, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Lazarev, Valery, 2007. "Political labor market, government policy, and stability of a non-democratic regime," MPRA Paper 2352, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? A few items listed on IDEAS are over 2000 years old!

This page was last updated on 2009-11-19.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.