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On Dictatorship, Economic Development and Stability

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  • Lionel Artige

Abstract

This paper aims to account for varying economic performances and political stability under dictatorship. We argue that economic welfare and social order are the contemporary relevant factors of political regimes' stability. Societies with low natural level of social order tend to tolerate predatory behavior from dictators in exchange of a provision of civil peace. The fear of anarchy may explain why populations are locked in the worst dictatorships. In contrast, in societies enjoying a relative natural civil peace, dictatorship is less likely to be predatory because low economic welfare may destabilize it.

Suggested Citation

  • Lionel Artige, 2004. "On Dictatorship, Economic Development and Stability," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 620.04, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    • Handle: RePEc:aub:autbar:620.04
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    2. Pierre PECHER, 2013. "Ethnic conflict, power dynamics and growth," LIDAM Discussion Papers IRES 2014008, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    anarchy; dictatorship; economic development; predation; social order.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H5 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies
    • O1 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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