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The Dynastic Cycle and the Stationary State

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Usher, Dan

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Abstract

A dynastic cycle is a periodic alternation of society between despotism and anarchy. In a society of farmers, rulers, and bandits, population growth simultaneously impoverishes farmers and reduces the ruler's surplus per head. Society evolves into a despotic stationary state or into a dynastic cycle dependent on whether poverty among farmers chokes off population growth before the surplus shrinks to the point where rulers turn to banditry. Copyright 1989 by American Economic Association.

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Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 79 (1989)
Issue (Month): 5 (December)
Pages: 1031-44
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Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:79:y:1989:i:5:p:1031-44

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  6. Boaz Moselle & Ben Polak, 1997. "A Model of a Predatory State," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1158, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
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