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Land Reform and the Political Organization of Agriculture

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Author Info
Conning, Jonathan H
Robinson, James A

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Abstract

The modern theory of agrarian organization has studied how the economic environment determines organizational form under the assumption of stable property rights to land. The political economy literature has modeled the endogenous determination of property rights. In this Paper we propose a model in which the economic organization of agriculture and the political equilibrium determining the distribution of property rights are jointly determined. In particular, because the form of organization may affect the probability and distribution of benefits from agrarian reform, it may be determined in anticipation of this impact. The model offers a reason for why tenancy, despite its economic advantages, has been so little used in countries where agrarian reform is a salient political issue. We argue that this in particular helps to understand the dearth of tenancy and the relative failure of land reform in Latin America.

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Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 3204.

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Date of creation: Feb 2002
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Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3204

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Related research
Keywords: agrarian organization; land reform; political economy;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
O12 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development

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  1. Jeon, Yoong-Deok & Kim, Young-Yong, 2000. "Land Reform, Income Redistribution, and Agricultural Production in Korea," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 48(2), pages 253-68, January.
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  5. Robinson, James A., 1999. "When is a State Predatory?," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich.
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  13. Timothy Besley & Robin Burgess, 2000. "Land Reform, Poverty Reduction, And Growth: Evidence From India," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 115(2), pages 389-430, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  14. Grossman, Herschel I, 1994. "Production, Appropriation, and Land Reform," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 705-12, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  19. Binswanger, Hans P. & Deininger, Klaus & Feder, Gershon, 1995. "Power, distortions, revolt and reform in agricultural land relations," Handbook of Development Economics, in: Hollis Chenery† & T.N. Srinivasan (ed.), Handbook of Development Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 42, pages 2659-2772 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  20. Dixit, Avinash K & Londregan, John, 1994. "The Determinants of Success of Special Interests in Redistributive Politics," CEPR Discussion Papers 1054, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  25. Jonathan Conning, 2002. "Latifundia Economics," Hunter College Department of Economics Working Papers 02/1, Hunter College: Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  26. Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 1998. "Sources of Inefficiency in a Representative Democracy: A Dynamic Analysis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 139-56, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  27. Horowitz, Andrew W, 1993. "Time Paths of Land Reform: A Theoretical Model of Reform Dynamics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(4), pages 1003-10, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Assuncao, Juliano, 2006. "Land Reform and Landholdings in Brazil," Working Papers RP2006/137, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER). [Downloadable!]
  2. Juliano Junqueira Assunção, 2005. "Non-agricultural land use and land reform: theory and evidence from Brazil," Textos para discussão 496, Department of Economics PUC-Rio (Brazil). [Downloadable!]
  3. Bertocchi, Graziella, 2003. "The Law of Primogeniture and the Transition from Landed Aristocracy to Industrial Democracy," CEPR Discussion Papers 3723, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Jonathan Conning, 2002. "Latifundia Economics," Hunter College Department of Economics Working Papers 02/1, Hunter College: Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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