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Autocratic rule in ethnically-diverse societies

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Author Info
Amegashie, J. Atsu
Abstract

Richer and more educated citizens demand better governance than poorer citizens. They participate more in the political process, are more difficult to buy off, and tend to have the financial resources to support a revolt. An autocrat who is politically insecure may therefore not invest in income-enhancing goods like education, roads, the rule of law, etc. This argument is not new. The novelty of this paper is to argue that ethnic diversity and discrimination exacerbate an autocrat’s fear of the negative effect of high income or income-enhancing investments like public education on his political survival. The combination of ethnic diversity and the fear of survival results in low economic performance in ethnically-diverse autocracies. I show that under such circumstances, the proportion of national income that the autocrat appropriates to himself is increasing in the degree of ethnic diversity. An implication is that in such ethnically-diverse societies, kleptocrats may be better off with a bigger share of a smaller national income than they are with a smaller share of a bigger national income. Previous empirical work provides some support for my theory. I discuss applications and limitations of my results.

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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 8933.

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Date of creation: 02 Jun 2008
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:8933

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Related research
Keywords: autocracy ethnic diversity kleptocracy public capital selectorate

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism

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  1. Martin C. McGuire & Mancur Olson Jr., 1996. "The Economics of Autocracy and Majority Rule: The Invisible Hand and the Use of Force," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 34(1), pages 72-96, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Bluedorn, John C., 2001. "Can democracy help? Growth and ethnic divisions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 121-126, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, 2000. "Political Losers as a Barrier to Economic Development," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(2), pages 126-130, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Alberto Alesina & Eliana La Ferrara, 2005. "Ethnic Diversity and Economic Performance," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 43(3), pages 762-800, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Robinson, James A. & Torvik, Ragnar, 2005. "White elephants," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(2-3), pages 197-210, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Timothy Besley & Masayuki Kudamatsu, 2007. "Making Autocracy Work," STICERD - Development Economics Papers 48, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Alberto Alesina & Eliana La Ferrara, 2000. "Participation In Heterogeneous Communities," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 115(3), pages 847-904, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Ling Shen, 2007. "When will a Dictator be Good?," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 31(2), pages 343-366, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Robert J. Barro, 1999. "Determinants of Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(S6), pages S158-29, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Gerard Padro I Miquel, 2007. "The Control of Politicians in Divided Societies: The Politics of Fear," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 74(4), pages 1259-1274, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Alesina, Alberto & Baqir, Reza & Easterly, William, 1999. "Public goods and ethnic divisions," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2108, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
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  12. Paul Collier, 2001. "Implications of ethnic diversity," Economic Policy, CEPR, CES, MSH, vol. 16(32), pages 127-166, 04. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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