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Making Autocracy Work

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Author Info
Timothy Besley
Masayuki Kudamatsu

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Abstract

One of the key goals of political economy is to understand how institutional arrangementsshape policy outcomes. This paper studies a comparatively neglected aspect of this - theforces that shape heterogeneous performance of autocracies. The paper develops a simpletheoretical model of accountability in the absence of regularized elections. Leadershipturnover is managed by a selectorate - a group of individuals on whom the leader depends tohold onto power. Good policy is institutionalized when the selectorate removes poorlyperforming leaders from office. This requires that the selectorate's hold on power is not toodependent on a specific leader being in office. The paper looks empirically at spells ofautocracy to establish cases where it has been successful according to various objectivecriteria. We use these case studies to identify the selectorate in specific instances of successfulautocracy. We also show that, consistent with the theory, leadership turnover in successfulautocracies is higher than in unsuccessful autocracies. Finally, we show by exploitingleadership deaths from natural causes that successful autocracies appear to have found waysfor selectorates to nominate successors without losing power - a feature which is alsoconsistent with the theoretical approach.

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Paper provided by Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE in its series STICERD - Development Economics Papers with number 48.

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Date of creation: May 2007
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Handle: RePEc:cep:stidep:48

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Related research
Keywords: Keywords: dictatorship democracy

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism
P26 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Systems and Transition Economies - - - Political Economy

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References listed on IDEAS
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  23. Jody Overland & Kenneth Simons & Michael Spagat, 2005. "Political instability and growth in dictatorships," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 125(3), pages 445-470, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  24. Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson & James A. Robinson, 2001. "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(5), pages 1369-1401, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  25. Timothy Besley & Masayuki Kudamatsu, 2006. "Health and Democracy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(2), pages 313-318, May.
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  28. Timothy Besley, 2005. "Political Selection," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 19(3), pages 43-60, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  30. Jennifer Gandhi & Adam Przeworski, 2006. "Cooperation, Cooptation, And Rebellion Under Dictatorships," Economics and Politics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 18(1), pages 1-26, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 2007. "The Growth Effect of Democracy: Is It Heterogeneous and How Can It Be Estimated?," CEPR Discussion Papers 6339, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Sumon Majumdar & Sharun Mukand, 2007. "The Leader as Catalyst: On Leadership and the Mechanics of Institutional Change," Working Papers 1128, Queen's University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Amegashie, J. Atsu, 2008. "Autocratic rule in ethnically-diverse societies," MPRA Paper 8933, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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