Consensual and Conflictual Democratization, Rule of Law, and Development
AbstractThis paper investigates the endogenous emergence of democracy and rule of law in an economy where heterogeneous individuals can get involved in predation activities. Decisions about public policies concern the extent of fiscal redistribution and property rights, whose costs depend on the extent of predation in the population. We characterize the dynamic evolution of the economy in which both the political regimes and public policies are endogenously determined. The theory delivers several novel results. Multiple politico-economic equilibria involving different public policies can be sustained conditional on beliefs about property rights enforcement. Democratization is endogenous, but the features of democracies are shown to be crucially related to the conditions under which democratization initially takes place. Democratic transitions supported by a large consensus serve as coordination device and lead to better protection of property and more stable political systems than democratic transitions imposed under conflictual environments. Conflictual transitions lead to failed democracies with potentially worse property rights protection than oligarchies. The novel predictions are in line with existing evidence and with results from newly collected data on constitutional principles.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 6328.
Date of creation: Jun 2007
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 77 Bastwick Street, London EC1V 3PZ
Phone: 44 - 20 - 7183 8801
Fax: 44 - 20 - 7183 8820
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H10 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - General
- N10 - Economic History - - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics; Industrial Structure; Growth; Fluctuations - - - General, International, or Comparative
- O10 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-06-30 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2007-06-30 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-DEV-2007-06-30 (Development)
- NEP-POL-2007-06-30 (Positive Political Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2007-06-30 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Cervellati, Matteo & Fortunato, Piergiuseppe & Sunde, Uwe, 2011.
"Democratization and Civil Liberties: The Role of Violence During the Transition,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
8315, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Cervellati, Matteo & Fortunato, Piergiuseppe & Sunde, Uwe, 2011. "Democratization and Civil Liberties: The Role of Violence During the Transition," Economics Working Paper Series 1108, University of St. Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science.
- Cervellati, Matteo & Fortunato, Piergiuseppe & Sunde, Uwe, 2011. "Democratization and Civil Liberties: The Role of Violence During the Transition," IZA Discussion Papers 5555, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.