The Political Economics of the Arab Spring
AbstractThe Arab Spring has led to very different outcomes across the Arab world. I present a highly stylized model of the Arab Spring to better understand these differences. In this model, dictators from the ethnic or religious majority group concede power if their country is oil-poor, but can stay in power by bribing the people if their country is oil-rich. Dictators from the minority group often rely on other members of their group to repress protests and to fight the majority group if necessary. These predictions are consistent with observed outcomes in Egypt, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, and elsewhere.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Oxford Centre for the Analysis of Resource Rich Economies, University of Oxford in its series OxCarre Working Papers with number 101.
Date of creation: 2013
Date of revision:
Arab Spring; political transitions; repression; civil conflict; oil; divided societies;
Other versions of this item:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-03-23 (All new papers)
- NEP-ARA-2013-03-23 (MENA - Middle East & North Africa)
- NEP-CDM-2013-03-23 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-ENE-2013-03-23 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-POL-2013-03-23 (Positive Political Economics)
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