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Votes for excluded minorities and the voting behavior of the existing majority: A laboratory experiment

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  • Hizen, Yoichi
  • Kamijo, Yoshio
  • Tamura, Teruyuki

Abstract

When voting rights are extended, people pay attention to the behavior of new voters. However, the reactions of existing voters are also crucial for voting outcomes after enfranchisement. This study conducts a laboratory experiment to compare the effects of extending voting rights to minorities who did not initially have the right to vote and granting proxy votes to the existing majority who vote on behalf of the minorities. We observe that enfranchising excluded minorities increases the proportion of votes in favor of minorities. However, the realized proportion is not as large as expected. Proxy voting does not increase this proportion. Behind such aggregate outcomes, some existing majorities alter their vote choices to protect their payoffs in response to changes in voting rules. Electoral reforms that do not consider such a response but rely on the altruism of the existing majority are unlikely to succeed in reflecting minorities’ interests.

Suggested Citation

  • Hizen, Yoichi & Kamijo, Yoshio & Tamura, Teruyuki, 2023. "Votes for excluded minorities and the voting behavior of the existing majority: A laboratory experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 209(C), pages 348-361.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:209:y:2023:i:c:p:348-361
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2023.03.014
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Enfranchisement; Proxy vote; Electoral reform; Laboratory experiment;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior

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