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Expressive Voting and Electoral Equilibrium

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Author Info
 Brennan, Geoffrey
Hamlin, Alan

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Abstract

There are two rival accounts of rational voting in the public choice tradition: the mainstream instrumental account, that sees the vote as a revelation of preference over possible electoral outcomes, essentially analogous to a market choice; and the expressive account, that sees the vote as expressing support for one or other electoral options, rather like cheering at a football match. This paper attempts to lay out some of the implications of the expressive account of voting for the issue of who votes as well as for the nature of political equilibrium, and to compare these implications with those derived from the instrumental account. The authors also identify and discuss the alternative views of the domain of electoral politics associated with the instrumental and expressive accounts of voting, and sketch a route towards the integration of expressive and instrumental ideas in the analysis of rational electoral politics. Copyright 1998 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

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Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.

Volume (Year): 95 (1998)
Issue (Month): 1-2 (April)
Pages: 149-75
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Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:95:y:1998:i:1-2:p:149-75

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  2. Schultz, Christian, 1996. "Polarization and Inefficient Policies," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 63(2), pages 331-44, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Slutsky, Steven, 1975. "Abstentions and majority equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 292-304, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Levin, Jonathan & Nalebuff, Barry, 1995. "An Introduction to Vote-Counting Schemes," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 3-26, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Comanor, William S., 1976. "The median voter rule and the theory of political choice," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(1-2), pages 169-177. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Myerson, Roger B, 1995. "Analysis of Democratic Institutions: Structure, Conduct and Performance," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 77-89, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Weber, Shlomo, 1992. "On Hierarchical Spatial Competition," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 59(2), pages 407-25, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Alesina, Alberto, 1988. "Credibility and Policy Convergence in a Two-Party System with Rational Voters," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 796-805, September.
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  1. Johansson-Stenman, Olof & Martinsson, Peter, 2003. "Anyone for Higher Speed Limits? - Self-Interested and Adaptive Political Preferences," Working Papers in Economics 95, Göteborg University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Boockmann, Bernhard, 2002. "Mixed motives : an empirical analysis of ILO roll-call votes," ZEW Discussion Papers 02-40, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  3. Stephen Drinkwater & Colin Jennings, 2007. "Who are the expressive voters?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 132(1), pages 179-189, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. John Ashworth & Benny Geys & Bruno Heyndels, 2006. "Everyone likes a winner: An empirical test of the effect of electoral closeness on turnout in a context of expressive voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 128(3), pages 383-405, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Monika Bütler & Michel André Maréchal, 2007. "Framing Effects in Political Decision Making: Evidence From a Natural Voting Experiment," University of St. Gallen Department of Economics working paper series 2007 2007-04, Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Colin Jennings, 2009. "The Good, the Bad and the Populist: A Model of Political Agency with Emotional Voters," Working Papers 09-09, University of Strathclyde Business School, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  7. Colin Jennings & Alan Hamlin, 2009. "Expressive Political Behaviour: Foundations, Scope and Implications," Working Papers 09-18, University of Strathclyde Business School, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  8. Peter Calcagno & Christopher Westley, 2008. "An institutional analysis of voter turnout: the role of primary type and the expressive and instrumental voting hypotheses," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 19(2), pages 94-110, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Tyler Cowen, 2005. "Self-deception as the root of political failure," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 124(3), pages 437-451, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Keith Jakee & Guang-Zhen Sun, 2006. "Is compulsory voting more democratic?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 129(1), pages 61-75, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Darren Grant & Michael Toma, 2008. "Elemental tests of the traditional rational voting model," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 137(1), pages 173-195, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Rotemberg, Julio J., 2005. "Attitude-Dependent Altruism, Turnout and Voting," CEPR Discussion Papers 5146, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  13. Axel Dreher & Bernhard Boockmann, 2007. "Do Human Rights Offenders Oppose Human Rights Resolutions in the United Nations?," KOF Working papers 07-163, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich. [Downloadable!]
  14. Jean-Robert Tyran, 2002. "Voting when Money and Morals Conflict - An Experimental Test of Expressive Voting," University of St. Gallen Department of Economics working paper series 2002 2002-07, Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen. [Downloadable!]
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