In: Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications
AbstractStochastic games model repeated play with symmetric information. We analyze their value in the zero-sum case, and approach the study of their equilibria in the non-zero-sum case.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
This chapter was published in:
This item is provided by Elsevier in its series Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications with number 3-47.
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/bookseriesdescription.cws_home/BS_HE/description
Other versions of this item:
- Mertens, J.-F. & Neyman, A., . "Stochastic games," CORE Discussion Papers RP -454, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- MERTENS, Jean-François, . "Stochastic games," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1587, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page. reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Access and download statisticsgeneral information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.