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Dynamic Voting in Clubs

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  • Kevin Roberts

Abstract

This paper examines the process and outcomes of democratic decision-making in clubs where a club is defined by their sets of members whose preferences and decisions relate to the set of members in the club: the electorate to endogenous. Examples range from international organizations like the European Union and NATO to firms, workers' cooperatives and trade unions. Although the policy space is infinite, a majority voting equilibrium exists under plausible conditions and the equilibrium rule and the dynamics of clubs are characterised. Two types of club, one where a group funds some public good and the other where a given benefit is shared by the group, are analysed in detail.

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File URL: http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/dps/te/te367.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE in its series STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series with number 367.

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Date of creation: Jan 1999
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Handle: RePEc:cep:stitep:367

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Web page: http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/_new/publications/default.asp

Related research

Keywords: cooperatives; local public goods; majority voting; median voter; organization size; partnerships; trade unions.;

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References

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  1. Roberts, Kevin W. S., 1977. "Voting over income tax schedules," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(3), pages 329-340, December.
  2. Krusell, P. & Rios-Rull, J.V., 1993. "Vested Interests in a Positive Theory of Stagnation and Growth," Papers 547, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
  3. Kevin Roberts, 1989. "The Theory of Union Behaviour: Labour Hoarding and Endogenous Hysteresis," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 209, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
  4. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061414, December.
  5. Leininger, Wolfgang, 1986. "The Existence of Perfect Equilibria in a Model of Growth with Altruism between Generations," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(3), pages 349-67, July.
  6. Caplin, Andrew S & Nalebuff, Barry J, 1988. "On 64%-Majority Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(4), pages 787-814, July.
  7. Grandmont, Jean-Michel, 1978. "Intermediate Preferences and the Majority Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(2), pages 317-30, March.
  8. Layard, R., 1990. "Lay-offs by seniority and equilibrium employment," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 295-298, March.
  9. Moore, John, 1988. "Contracting between Two Parties with Private Information," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(1), pages 49-69, January.
  10. Ng, Yew-Kwang, 1973. "The Economic Theory of Clubs: Pareto Optimality Conditions," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 40(159), pages 291-98, August.
  11. Klevorick, Alvin K. & Kramer, Gerald H., 1973. "Social choice on pollution management: the genossenschaften," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(2), pages 101-146, April.
  12. Gans, Joshua S. & Smart, Michael, 1996. "Majority voting with single-crossing preferences," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 219-237, February.
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