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Portfolio diversification and internalization of production externalities through majority voting Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Crès, Hervé ()
Tvede, Mich
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In absence of markets for externalities, the authors look for governances and conditions under which majority voting among shareholders is likely to give rise to efficient internalization. The central and natural role played by a governance of stakeholders is underlined and benchmarked.
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Paper provided by HEC Paris in its series Les Cahiers de Recherche with number
816.
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Length: 29 pages
Date of creation: 25 Jan 2006Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ebg:heccah:0816Contact details of provider: Postal: HEC Paris, 78351 Jouy-en-Josas cedex, France Web page: http://www.hec.fr/ More information through EDIRC
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Keywords: Production externalities ; majority voting ; portfolio diversification ; general equilibrium ; stakeholder governance ; mean voter ; Other versions of this item:
Find related papers by JEL classification: D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior D52 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Incomplete Markets D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations G39 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Other
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References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: DeMarzo, Peter M, 1993.
"Majority Voting and Corporate Control: The Rule of the Dominant Shareholder ,"
Review of Economic Studies ,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 60(3), pages 713-34, July.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Grandmont, Jean-Michel, 1978.
"Intermediate Preferences and the Majority Rule ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 46(2), pages 317-30, March.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1979.
"A Theory of Competitive Equilibrium in Stock Market Economies ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 47(2), pages 293-329, March.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Sadanand, Asha B & Williamson, John M, 1991.
"Equilibrium in a Stock Market Economy with Shareholder Voting ,"
International Economic Review ,
Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 32(1), pages 1-35, February.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Cass, David & Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1970.
"The structure of investor preferences and asset returns, and separability in portfolio allocation: A contribution to the pure theory of mutual funds ,"
Journal of Economic Theory ,
Elsevier, vol. 2(2), pages 122-160, June.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Bergstrom, Ted C, 1979.
" When Does Majority Rule Supply Public Goods Efficiently? ,"
Scandinavian Journal of Economics ,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 81(2), pages 216-26.
Other versions: Caplin, Andrew S & Nalebuff, Barry J, 1988.
"On 64%-Majority Rule ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 56(4), pages 787-814, July.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Caplin, Andrew & Nalebuff, Barry, 1991.
"Aggregation and Social Choice: A Mean Voter Theorem ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 59(1), pages 1-23, January.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Andrew Caplin & Barry Nalebuff, 1990.
"Aggregation and Social Choice: A Mean Voter Theorem ,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
938, Cowles Foundation, Yale University.
[Downloadable!] Caplin, A. & Nalebuff, B., 1989.
"Aggregation And Social Choice: A Mean Voter Theorem ,"
Discussion Papers
1989_31, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
Kelsey, David & Milne, Frank, 1996.
"The existence of equilibrium in incomplete markets and the objective function of the firm ,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics ,
Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 229-245.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
CRES, Hervé & TVEDE, Mich, 2004.
"The Dreze and Grossman-Hart criteria for production in incomplete markets: Voting foundations and compared political stability ,"
Les Cahiers de Recherche
794, HEC Paris.
[Downloadable!]
Simon Benninga & Eitan Muller, 1979.
"Majority Choice and the Objective Function of the Firm under Uncertainty ,"
Bell Journal of Economics ,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(2), pages 670-682, Autumn.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Greenberg, Joseph, 1979.
"Consistent Majority Rules over Compact Sets of Alternatives ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 47(3), pages 627-36, May.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Barlow, Robin, 1970.
"Efficiency Aspects of Local School Finance ,"
Journal of Political Economy ,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 78(5), pages 1028-40, Sept.-Oct.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full
references Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Herve Cres & M. Utku Unver, 2005.
"Ideology and existence of 50%-majority equilibria in multidimensional spatial voting models ,"
Microeconomics
0506007, EconWPA.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Crès, Hervé & Ünver, Utku, 2006.
"Ideology and existence of 50%-majority equilibria in multidimensional spatial voting models ,"
Les Cahiers de Recherche
818, HEC Paris.
[Downloadable!] M.Utku Unver & Herve Cres & M. Utku Unver, 2005.
"Ideology and Existence of 50%-Majority Equilibria in Multidimensional Spatial Voting Models ,"
Working Papers
261, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics, revised Jan 2005.
[Downloadable!] Hervé Crès & M. Utku Ünver, 2008.
"Ideology and Existence of 50%-Majority Equilibria in Multidimensional Spatial Voting Models ,"
Boston College Working Papers in Economics
716, Boston College Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
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