Portfolio diversification and internalization of production externalities through majority voting
AbstractIn absence of markets for externalities, the authors look for governances and conditions under which majority voting among shareholders is likely to give rise to efficient internalization. The central and natural role played by a governance of stakeholders is underlined and benchmarked.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by HEC Paris in its series Les Cahiers de Recherche with number 816.
Length: 29 pages
Date of creation: 25 Jan 2006
Date of revision:
Production externalities; majority voting; portfolio diversification; general equilibrium; stakeholder governance; mean voter;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
- D52 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Incomplete Markets
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- G39 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Other
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-01-29 (All new papers)
- NEP-FIN-2006-01-29 (Finance)
- NEP-MIC-2006-01-29 (Microeconomics)
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