Ideology and existence of 50%-majority equilibria in multidimensional spatial voting models
AbstractWhen aggregating individual preferences through the majority rule in an n-dimensional spatial voting model, the `worst-case' scenario is a social choice configuration where no political equilibrium exists unless a super majority rate as high as 1-1/n is adopted. In this paper we assume that a lower d-dimensional (d smaller than n) linear map spans the possible candidates' platforms. These d `ideological' dimensions imply some linkages between the n political issues. We randomize over these linkages and show that there almost surely exists a 50%-majority equilibria in the above worst-case scenario, when n grows to infinity. Moreover the equilibrium is the mean voter. The speed of convergence (toward 50%) of the super majority rate guaranteeing existence of equilibrium is computed for d=1 and 2.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by EconWPA in its series Microeconomics with number 0506007.
Date of creation: 21 Jun 2005
Date of revision:
Note: Type of Document - pdf
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://18.104.22.168
Other versions of this item:
- Herve Cres & M. Utku Unver, 2010. "Ideology And Existence Of 50%-Majority Equilibria In Multidimensional Spatial Voting Models," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 22(4), pages 431-444, October.
- M.Utku Unver, 2005. "Ideology and Existence of 50%-Majority Equilibria in Multidimensional Spatial Voting Models," Working Papers 261, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics, revised Jan 2005.
- Crès, Hervé & Ünver, Utku, 2006. "Ideology and existence of 50%-majority equilibria in multidimensional spatial voting models," Les Cahiers de Recherche 818, HEC Paris.
- Hervé Crès & M. Utku Ünver, 2008. "Ideology and Existence of 50%-Majority Equilibria in Multidimensional Spatial Voting Models," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 716, Boston College Department of Economics.
- D1 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior
- D2 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations
- D3 - Microeconomics - - Distribution
- D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-07-03 (All new papers)
- NEP-DCM-2005-07-03 (Discrete Choice Models)
- NEP-POL-2005-07-03 (Positive Political Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Caplin, Andrew S & Nalebuff, Barry J, 1988. "On 64%-Majority Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(4), pages 787-814, July.
- Caplin, A. & Nalebuff, B., 1989.
"Aggregation And Social Choice: A Mean Voter Theorem,"
1989_31, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
- Caplin, Andrew & Nalebuff, Barry, 1991. "Aggregation and Social Choice: A Mean Voter Theorem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(1), pages 1-23, January.
- Andrew Caplin & Barry Nalebuff, 1990. "Aggregation and Social Choice: A Mean Voter Theorem," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 938, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Crès, Hervé & Tvede, Mich, 2006. "Portfolio diversification and internalization of production externalities through majority voting," Les Cahiers de Recherche 816, HEC Paris.
- Grandmont, Jean-Michel, 1978. "Intermediate Preferences and the Majority Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(2), pages 317-30, March.
- Greenberg, Joseph, 1979. "Consistent Majority Rules over Compact Sets of Alternatives," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(3), pages 627-36, May.
- Ferejohn, John A. & Grether, David M., .
"On a Class of Rational Social Decision Procedures,"
25, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (EconWPA).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.